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LGBTQIA+ PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION CASES:  
THE BATTLE BETWEEN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
AND CIVIL RIGHTS 
Jamie Reinah* 
 
Protections for LGBTQIA+ Americans have greatly expanded since the 
U.S. Supreme Court recognized marriage equality in Obergefell v. Hodges, 
but the debate about whether business owners can refuse to serve 
LGBTQIA+ couples on religious grounds has grown more bitterly divided.  
The free exercise of religion is a fundamental constitutional right, and it is 
strongly protected at both the federal and state levels.  At the same time, 
LGBTQIA+ couples are protected from receiving unequal treatment in 
public places under state antidiscrimination laws. 
The clash between religion and LGBTQIA+ rights has culminated in a 
line of cases that present difficult questions for courts concerning the 
balance between these competing interests.  This Note discusses the battle 
being waged between liberty and equality in these cases and argues that the 
current legal doctrine exacerbates this inherent conflict.  Ultimately, this 
Note proposes a more streamlined test that state courts can utilize when 
balancing business owners’ religious liberty interests against the state’s 
interests in ensuring equality for LGBTQIA+ Americans. 
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Five years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its landmark decision in 
Obergefell v. Hodges,1 recognizing a constitutionally protected right to 
same-sex marriage.2  Leading up to and following the Court’s decision, 
various state and local governments passed new laws or revised existing 
laws to protect members of the LGBTQIA+3 community from 
discrimination in places of public accommodation.4  These recently enacted 
public accommodation laws prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation5 and, in certain jurisdictions, marital status and gender identity.6  
 
 1. 576 U.S. 644 (2015). 
 2. Id. at 679–81. 
 3. LGBTQIA+ is an acronym for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex, 
and asexual or ally.  See Michael Gold, The ABCs of L.G.B.T.Q.I.A.+, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/21/style/lgbtq-gender-language.html [https:// 
perma.cc/KM6J-UJ2S].  The plus sign denotes all other gender and sexual identities not 
represented by the other categories.  Id. 
 4. A place of “public accommodation” is any business that provides goods or services 
to members of the public. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 5. Currently, twenty-four states and the District of Columbia have laws prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. See State Public Accommodation Laws, 
NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (June 25, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-
and-criminal-justice/state-public-accommodation-laws.aspx#NY6 [https://perma.cc/V79E-
PH7E]; see also, e.g., 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-24-2 (2021) (stating that public-facing 
businesses shall not “directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person on 
account of . . . sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, any of the accommodations, 
advantages, facilities, or privileges of that public place”). 
 6. Currently, seventeen states have laws prohibiting discrimination based on marital 
status, and twenty-three states have laws prohibiting discrimination based on gender identity. 
See State Public Accommodation Laws, supra note 5.  In addition to sexual orientation, the 
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While the number of Americans supporting these public accommodation 
laws7 has grown substantially,8 the debate about whether business owners 
can refuse to serve LGBTQIA+ couples on religious grounds has 
intensified.9  In his Obergefell dissent, Chief Justice Roberts anticipated 
these rising tensions:  “Hard questions [will] arise when people of faith 
exercise religion in ways that may be seen to conflict with the new right to 
same-sex marriage . . . .”10 
Religious business owners who have to choose between adhering to their 
religious beliefs and serving LGBTQIA+ couples have brought 
constitutional and state law claims seeking religious exemptions from state 
antidiscrimination laws.11  For these business owners, providing goods and 
services in connection with a same-sex wedding would be a deeply sinful 
act.12  However, when LGBTQIA+ individuals are denied goods and 
services, they suffer harm to their personhood and are deemed to be inferior 
 
District of Columbia’s antidiscrimination laws include marital status and gender identity as 
protected classes. Id. 
 7. This Note uses “public accommodation laws” and “antidiscrimination laws” 
interchangeably. 
 8. A recent survey found that 72 percent of Americans favor laws that would protect 
LGBTQIA+ Americans against discrimination in places of public accommodation. See 
Broad Support for LGBT Rights Across All 50 States:  Findings from the 2019 American 
Values Atlas, PUB. RELIGION RSCH. INST. (Apr. 14, 2020), 
https://www.prri.org/research/broad-support-for-lgbt-rights/#page-section-2 
[https://perma.cc/U75A-GUTT]. 
 9. See TJ Denley, Balancing Burdens in Religious Freedom Claims, 26 CARDOZO J. 
EQUAL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 207, 209 (2020) (“What happens when two different views of 
religion or morality are opposed?  Which belief or morality—religion or equality—trumps 
the other?”). 
 10. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 711 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also 
Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex-Marriage and Religious-Liberty Claims Have in Common, 
5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 206, 209 (2010) (arguing that the recognition of same-sex marriage 
will exacerbate the conflicts between LGBTQIA+ rights and religious liberty); Douglas 
Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 839, 846 (“[T]he 
biggest problem for religious liberty in our time is deep disagreements over sexual 
morality . . . . [including] disagreements about . . . gay rights, and same-sex marriage.”). 
 11. This Note refers to these cases as “LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases.”  For a 
more detailed explanation of religious exemptions, see infra Part I.A. 
 12. See Berg, supra note 10, at 215–16; see also Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty for 
Politically Active Minority Groups:  A Response to NeJaime and Siegel, 125 YALE L.J.F. 
369, 378 (2016); Brief of Christian Legal Society et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 31, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 
16-111), 2017 WL 4005662, at *31 [hereinafter Brief of Christian Legal Society]. 
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members of society.13  Conceptions of liberty and equality are thus pitted 
against each other in LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases.14 
The conflict between liberty and equality in these cases is heightened due 
to current religious exemption law.15  Because of its precedent in 
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. 
Smith,16 the Supreme Court has not fully weighed in on this conflict.17  This 
was made clear in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission.18  In Masterpiece Cakeshop, a religious baker challenged the 
application of Colorado’s antidiscrimination law, which would have 
required him to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple in violation of 
his sincerely held religious beliefs.19  While the Court decided the case in 
favor of the baker on narrow free exercise grounds, it did not address the 
broader questions about how to resolve conflicts between religious freedom 
and LGBTQIA+ rights.20  To consider these questions, the Court would 
have needed to revisit its holding in Smith; the Court was not explicitly 
asked to do this in Masterpiece Cakeshop.21 
 
 13. See Douglas Laycock, The Wedding-Vendor Cases, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 49, 
65 (2018) (contending that the religious business owners and LGBTQIA+ couples both 
suffer emotional harms); Debbie Munn, How It Feels When Someone Refuses to Make Your 
Son a Wedding Cake, TIME (Oct. 27, 2017, 2:48 PM), https://time.com/4991839 
/masterpiece-cakeshop-supreme-court-gay-discrimination/ [https://perma.cc/2X3G-LCAM] 
(“I still see today how that day changed their lives.  When they walk into a store, there’s that 
nagging feeling in the back of their mind telling them that this might be the day that they get 
turned away again.”). 
 14. See Laycock, supra note 10, at 866 (“[W]hat one side views as a grave evil, the other 
side views as a fundamental human right.”). 
 15. See infra Part II.B. 
 16. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  Under Smith, religious claimants are not entitled to 
exemptions from facially neutral laws of general applicability under the Free Exercise 
Clause. See id. at 879.  Antidiscrimination laws are neutral laws of general applicability. See 
infra Part I.B.2. 
 17. See infra Part II.A. 
 18. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
 19. See id. at 1726.  Because Smith precluded the baker from asserting a successful 
religious exemption claim under the Free Exercise Clause, his main argument for an 
exemption was on compelled speech grounds. See infra Part II.A.1.  The baker also asserted 
an as-applied discrimination claim under the Free Exercise Clause; this was the basis for the 
Court’s decision. Id. 
 20. See Micah Schwartzman et al., Symposium:  Religious Privilege in Fulton and 
Beyond, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 2, 2020, 9:29 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/ 
2020/11/symposium-religious-privilege-in-fulton-and-beyond/ [https://perma.cc/GE8X-
CW3M]; see also Leslie Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus, 132 
HARV. L. REV. 133, 134 (2018) (commenting on how the Court in Masterpiece Cakeshop 
avoided central questions in the case). 
 21. Following Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court was presented with two other 
LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases involving wedding vendors but vacated the 
judgments in both cases. See State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. (Arlene I), 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 
2017), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018) (mem.); Klein v. Or. Bureau 
of Lab. & Indus., 410 P.3d 1051 (Or. Ct. App. 2017), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 139 
S. Ct. 2713 (2019) (mem.).  As such, Smith remains the controlling free exercise authority in 
LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases. See Holly Hollman, Court Requires Religious 
Exemption but Leaves Many Questions Unanswered, SCOTUSBLOG (June 22, 2021, 3:02 
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The Court, however, was presented with this exact question—whether to 
revisit Smith—in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.22  In Fulton, 
the City of Philadelphia declined to renew a contractual relationship with a 
religious foster care agency that stated that it would certify same-sex 
couples as foster parents.23  Although the foster care agency petitioned the 
Court to reconsider its holding in Smith, the Court declined to do so.24  
Instead, the Court followed a different line of free exercise cases and found 
the government’s conduct to be unconstitutional.25  Thus, the Court 
sidestepped a ripe opportunity to issue guidance on the broader conflict 
between religious liberty and LGBTQIA+ rights.26 
Because of Smith’s constitutional barrier, religious claimants also bring 
religious exemption claims under state law.27  In many states, religious 
exemption claims are subjected to the “compelling interest” test.28  When 
applying the compelling interest test, there are disagreements among state 
courts and scholars over the compelling interest served by 
antidiscrimination laws and the extent to which the harm suffered by the 
LGBTQIA+ couple should be factored into the analysis.29  Because of these 
disagreements, state courts reach conflicting results, which exacerbate the 
underlying conflict between religious liberty and LGBTQIA+ rights.30 
LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases are not going away; rather, 
they are growing more frequent and more complex.31  As illustrated by 
Fulton, these cases are expanding into other areas beyond wedding 
vendors.32  Because these cases involve fundamental questions of how to 




 22. 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021). 
 23. See id. at 1875–76. 
 24. See id. at 1877. 
 25. Id. at 1878, 1881. 
 26. See id. at 1926 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 27. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing religious exemption claims brought under state 
law). 
 28. See Mark L. Movsesian, Masterpiece Cakeshop and the Future of Religious 
Freedom, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 711, 715 (2019).  Under the compelling interest test, 
the government may substantially burden a person’s religious beliefs only if it has a 
compelling interest in doing so and the burden is the least restrictive means of achieving its 
compelling ends. Id.  For a detailed discussion of the compelling interest test, see infra Parts 
I.A, II.B.2. 
 29. See infra Part II.C. 
 30. See Movsesian, supra note 28, at 715–16. 
 31. See id. at 716; see also Hollman, supra note 21 (“But Fulton and Masterpiece have 
done little to help lower courts, and the same conflicts will keep coming.”). 
 32. See, e.g., Gwen Aviles, Christian Day Care Center Rejects Child Because She Has 
Lesbian Parents, NBC NEWS (July 22, 2019, 5:50 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/ 
feature/nbc-out/christian-day-care-center-rejects-child-because-she-has-lesbian-n1032466 
[https://perma.cc/2V9G-FXSK] (discussing LGBTQIA+ discrimination in childcare); Tresa 
Baldas, Pediatrician Won’t Treat Baby with 2 Moms, USA TODAY (Feb. 18, 2015, 7:06 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/02/18/doctor-discrimination-baby/ 
23642091/ [https://perma.cc/8TBM-XCB7] (discussing LGBTQIA+ discrimination in 
healthcare); see also infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the Fulton case). 
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LGBTQIA+ rights, courts would benefit from having a more concrete 
judicial framework when adjudicating these disputes.  This Note proposes a 
streamlined compelling interest test that state courts can use when faced 
with claims for religious exemptions from state antidiscrimination laws.33 
Part I lays out the clash between religious liberty and LGBTQIA+ rights 
in LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases.  Part I first introduces 
religious liberty and the Free Exercise Clause and then discusses the 
development of LGBTQIA+ civil rights and the expanded protections for 
LGBTQIA+ Americans under antidiscrimination laws.  Part II analyzes the 
doctrinal challenges presented by current constitutional and statutory 
religious exemption law and outlines the disagreements among state courts 
over the analysis under the compelling interest test.  To properly balance 
the two competing interests in LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases, 
Part III proposes a judicial framework that calls for state courts to consider 
the harms suffered by LGBTQIA+ couples when applying the compelling 
interest test. 
I.  FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION AND LGBTQIA+ CIVIL RIGHTS 
LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases symbolize the culmination of 
the inherent clash between equality and religious liberty.  This part provides 
an overview of the key players in this conflict.  Part I.A discusses religious 
liberty and free exercise jurisprudence.  Part I.B outlines the development 
of LGBTQIA+ civil rights and the expanded role of state and local 
governments in protecting these rights through antidiscrimination laws. 
A.  The First Amendment and Religious Liberty 
Religious liberty is a fundamental constitutional right.  The First 
Amendment provides, in part, that “Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”34  
More commonly known as the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, 
these provisions prohibit the government from compelling or punishing the 
exercise of religious beliefs.35  Through the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
First Amendment’s protections are made applicable to state and local 
governments.36 
 
 33. With Smith in place, this Note focuses on the compelling interest test under state 
law.  However, if the Supreme Court were to overrule Smith, the proposed framework would 
be a workable standard for courts to use to analyze religious exemption claims under the 
Free Exercise Clause. See infra Part III. 
 34. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 35. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963) (“Government may neither compel 
affirmation of a repugnant belief; nor penalize or discriminate against individuals or groups 
because they hold religious views abhorrent to the authorities . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 36. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 
(1940). 
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The Supreme Court first interpreted the Free Exercise Clause in Reynolds 
v. United States.37  Although free exercise law has changed since Reynolds, 
there are two important groups of cases that dominate modern-day 
jurisprudence.  The first group deals with claims of government hostility 
toward a religious group or practice.38  The second group deals with 
claimants seeking religious exemptions from neutral laws of general 
applicability.39  In the first set of cases, the government targets or 
disparately treats a certain religious group.  The long-standing precedent in 
this area is Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.40 
In Lukumi, members of a Florida church challenged a city ordinance that 
prohibited the ritual sacrifice of animals.41  The church practiced Santeria, a 
West-African and Cuban religion that sacrifices animals as part of its 
ceremonial rituals.42  The Court declared the ordinance to be 
unconstitutional because it had a clear objective of prohibiting a religious 
practice.43  The Court held that “[a] law burdening religious practice that is 
not neutral or not of general application must undergo the most rigorous of 
scrutiny.”44  In other words, a law that is hostile toward or targets a 
religious group or practice must withstand strict scrutiny to comply with the 
First Amendment’s protections.45  The city was unable to meet this burden 
and, therefore, the Court ruled in favor of the church.46 
Cases like Lukumi where the government directly targets a specific 
religious group or practice are rare.47  There are only a few other cases that 
 
 37. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).  The Court upheld a federal polygamy law and a criminal charge 
against the defendant against his claim that he was exempt from complying with the criminal 
code because of his religion. See id. at 166. 
 38. See generally Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 
520 (1993). 
 39. See generally Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 40. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 41. Id. at 528. 
 42. Id. at 524–25. 
 43. See id. at 545–46.  While the church’s religious practices were subjected to the 
ordinance, the conduct of other secular entities, such as restaurants, was not regulated. See 
id. at 545. 
 44. Id. at 546. 
 45. See id.  Strict scrutiny is one of three levels of review that courts will apply to 
determine whether a law is constitutional. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 588 (6th ed. 2019).  A law will be upheld under strict scrutiny if it 
is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest and if it is the least restrictive 
means to achieve that interest. Id. at 588–89.  This Note uses “strict scrutiny” and 
“compelling interest test” interchangeably. 
 46. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546–47.  The Supreme Court has also applied strict scrutiny 
in cases where the government was found to have discriminated against religion generally, 
as compared to the ordinances in Lukumi that specifically targeted the Santeria religion. See, 
e.g., Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2025 (2017) 
(holding that Missouri’s refusal to provide a grant for playground resurfacing to a religious 
daycare center on account of its religious status violated the Free Exercise Clause); Espinoza 
v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2260 (2020) (concluding that Montana’s 
exclusion of parochial schools from its tuition assistance program violated the Free Exercise 
Clause because the exclusion was based solely on the “religious character” of the schools). 
 47. See Brian A. Freeman, Expiating the Sins of Yoder and Smith:  Toward a Unified 
Theory of First Amendment Exemptions from Neutral Laws of General Applicability, 66 MO. 
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fall on the Lukumi side of the free exercise spectrum.48  However, the 
principle from these cases is clear:  when the government generally 
disfavors a religious group or disparately treats a religious group, the 
government can prevail only by showing that its conduct is narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling government interest.49 
The second group of free exercise cases deals with claims for religious 
exemptions50 from neutral laws of general applicability.51  Unlike in 
Lukumi, where the legislation intentionally targeted the Santeria religion, in 
this group of cases, the legislation is neutral on its face but incidentally 
burdens a religious group or practice when applied.52  Employment 
Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith is the 
controlling authority for these cases.53 
In Smith, two members of a Native American church were terminated for 
cause and deemed ineligible for unemployment compensation because of 
their religious use of peyote, which was considered “misconduct” that 
violated Oregon’s controlled substances law.54  Justice Antonin Scalia, 
writing for the majority, rejected the contention that the plaintiffs were 
entitled to a religious exemption under the Free Exercise Clause because 
 
L. REV. 9, 29 (2001) (“[T]he Hialeah ordinances invalidated in [Lukumi] are rare examples 
of . . . attempts by government to persecute disfavored religions . . . .”). 
 48. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1729 
(2018) (finding that state officials showed hostility toward the claimant’s religious beliefs). 
 49. The Lukumi test demands a showing by the state of an interest “of the highest order.” 
Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2024 (quoting McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 (1978)); 
see also Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1734 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“[W]e know 
this with certainty:  when the government fails to act neutrally toward the free exercise of 
religion, it . . . can prevail only if it satisfies strict scrutiny . . . .”). 
 50. A religious exemption is a “court ruling or statutory provision declaring that 
otherwise valid regulations should not be applied in ways that significantly interfere with the 
religious freedom of organizations or individuals.” Thomas C. Berg, Religious 
Accommodation and the Welfare State, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 103, 105 (2015).  For 
another insightful definition of religious exemptions, see Michael W. McConnell, 
Accommodation of Religion:  An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 685, 686–87 (1992). 
 51. The government “fails to act neutrally when it proceeds in a manner intolerant of 
religious beliefs or restricts practices because of their religious nature.” Fulton v. City of 
Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1877 (2021); see also Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533 (“[I]f the 
object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, 
the law is not neutral.”).  A law is not generally applicable “if it prohibits religious conduct 
while permitting secular conduct that undermines the government’s interests in a similar 
way.” Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1877.  Laws are also not generally applicable if they invite the 
government “to consider the particular reasons for a person’s conduct by providing ‘a 
mechanism for individualized exemptions.’” Id. (quoting Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990) (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986))); see 
also Abner S. Greene, Barnette and Masterpiece Cakeshop:  Some Unanswered Questions, 
13 FIU L. REV. 667, 669 (2019) (describing a neutral law of general applicability as a 
“nondiscriminatory” law that is not “regarding religion alone”). 
 52. See Kara Loewentheil, When Free Exercise Is a Burden:  Protecting “Third 
Parties” in Religious Accommodation Law, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 433, 457 (2014). 
 53. See Loewentheil, supra note 52 at 457–58. 
 54. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. 
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“an individual’s religious beliefs [do not] excuse him from compliance with 
an otherwise valid law.”55 
Since the plaintiffs were challenging a neutral law of general 
applicability that incidentally burdened their religious practices, the Court 
concluded that it did not have to apply strict scrutiny.56  Instead, Justice 
Scalia reasoned that a lower standard of scrutiny—rational basis review—
was the appropriate standard to apply.57 
Before the Court reached its conclusion that the Free Exercise Clause 
does not provide for exemptions from otherwise neutral and generally 
applicable laws, the Court addressed a handful of pre-Smith religious 
exemption cases.  The first of these cases was Wisconsin v. Yoder.58  In 
Yoder, the Court held that Wisconsin could not require Amish parents to 
send their children to high school and granted the plaintiffs an exemption 
from Wisconsin’s compulsory schooling law under the Free Exercise 
Clause.59  In granting this exemption, the Court applied strict scrutiny.60 
In Smith, Justice Scalia distinguished Yoder, characterizing the Amish 
parents’ religious exemption claim as a “hybrid” rights claim.61  By 
contrast, the Smith claimants based their religious exemption claim solely 
on the Free Exercise Clause.62  Despite Justice Scalia’s attempt at 
distinguishing Yoder, his hybrid-rights theory did not gain much traction, 
and Yoder still stands essentially opposite Smith in the exemption bucket of 
free exercise case law.63  Because Yoder has not officially been overturned, 
it could present interesting questions should the Supreme Court ever decide 
to reinstate heightened scrutiny for religious exemption claims under the 
Free Exercise Clause.64 
 
 55. Id. at 878–79. 
 56. Id. at 885 (“To make an individual’s obligation to obey such a law contingent upon 
the law’s coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State’s interest is 
compelling . . . contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 57. See id. at 886 n.3.  To satisfy the rational basis test, the government need only prove 
that its legislative objective is related to a legitimate purpose. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 
45, at 587. 
 58. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 59. Id. at 234. 
 60. Id. at 214 (“[I]n order for Wisconsin to compel school attendance beyond the eighth 
grade . . . there [must be] a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest 
claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause.”). 
 61. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882; see also Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 
1915 (2021) (Alito, J., concurring) (“To dispose of Yoder, Smith was forced to invent yet 
another special category of cases, those involving ‘hybrid-rights’ claims.”). 
 62. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882. 
 63. See Steven H. Aden & Lee J. Strang, When a “Rule” Doesn’t Rule:  The Failure of 
the Oregon Employment Division v. Smith “Hybrid Rights Exception,” 108 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 573, 574 (2003) (noting how “hybrid rights claims have overwhelmingly failed to 
succeed”); Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1918 (“The ‘hybrid rights’ exception, which was essential to 
distinguish Yoder, has baffled the lower courts.”). 
 64. See Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1924 (arguing that the compelling interest test from Yoder 
and Sherbert should replace Smith); see also Thomas Berg & Douglas Laycock, Protecting 
Free Exercise Under Smith and After Smith, SCOTUSBLOG (June 19, 2021, 6:37 PM), 
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In addition to Yoder, Justice Scalia wrestled with another group of free 
exercise exemption cases:  the “Sherbert Quartet.”65  In these cases, the 
claimants terminated their existing employment for religious reasons66 and 
were subsequently denied state unemployment benefits for “fail[ing], 
without good cause . . . to accept available suitable work when offered.”67  
In all four cases, the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny and granted the 
claimant’s request for a religious exemption, holding that the government 
“could not condition the availability of unemployment insurance on an 
individual’s willingness to forgo conduct required by his religion.”68 
In Smith, Justice Scalia distinguished the Sherbert Quartet by noting that 
the conduct at issue in those cases was not prohibited by law, whereas 
peyote consumption was prohibited by controlled substance law in 
Oregon.69  Moreover, Justice Scalia pointed out that the Sherbert Quartet 
cases centered on individualized administrative determinations about what 
constitutes “good cause” for not working.70  By contrast, the plaintiffs in 
Smith violated the controlled substances law by ingesting peyote and, as a 
result, were ineligible to receive unemployment benefits.71 
In differentiating the Sherbert Quartet, Justice Scalia limited the 
application of strict scrutiny to a specific subset of free exercise cases.72  
Importantly, the Court in Fulton relied heavily on Justice Scalia’s 
understanding of the Sherbert Quartet in holding that Pennsylvania officials 
acted improperly when they refused to contract with a religious foster care 




 65. The “Sherbert Quartet” cases are:  Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment 
Security, 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission of Florida, 
480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division, 
450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See Prabha Sipi Bhandari, 
The Failure of Equal Regard to Explain the Sherbert Quartet, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 98–100 
(1997) (discussing the Sherbert Quartet cases). 
 66. The claimants in Frazee, Hobbie, and Sherbert were required to work on their 
Sabbath. See Frazee, 489 U.S. at 830; Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 138; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399.  
In Thomas, the claimant was transferred to a department that produced parts for military 
tanks, which violated his religious beliefs against the production of military weapons. See 
Thomas, 450 U.S. at 709. 
 67. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401 (alteration in original). 
 68. Smith, 494 U.S. at 876 (discussing the holdings of the Sherbert Quartet cases). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 884. 
 71. See id. 
 72. See id. at 885 (“We conclude today that the sounder approach, and the approach in 
accord with the vast majority of our precedents, is to hold the [Sherbert] test inapplicable to 
[the claimants’] challenges.”); see also Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The 
Vulnerability of Conscience:  The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1277–82 (1994) (elaborating on Justice Scalia’s understanding of the 
Sherbert Quartet cases and their application to unemployment insurance cases). 
 73. See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1878 (2021) (“Like the good 
cause provision in Sherbert, [the City’s standard foster care contract] incorporates a system 
of individual exemptions, made available in this case at the ‘sole discretion’ of the 
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The Court’s decision in Smith to adopt rational basis review—as opposed 
to strict scrutiny—as the new standard for religious exemption cases 
remains extremely controversial.74  In the aftermath of the Court’s decision, 
Congress enacted the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act of 199375 
(RFRA).76  RFRA reinstated the Court’s pre-Smith free exercise 
jurisprudence and provided that the government must satisfy strict scrutiny 
when it substantially burdens77 religious exercise.78  Under RFRA, the 
government must satisfy strict scrutiny “even if the burden [on religion] 
results from a rule of general applicability.”79  The Supreme Court in City 
of Boerne v. Flores,80 however, delivered a substantial blow to RFRA, 
invalidating the law as applied to the states.81 
In response to City of Boerne, Congress enacted the Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Person Act of 200082 (RLUIPA).83  Many states 
followed suit, passing their own religious freedom restoration acts (“state 
RFRAs”)84 or interpreting their constitutions to provide additional 
 
Commissioner.”).  By applying the Sherbert Quartet cases in Fulton, the Court left Smith 
intact. See infra Part II.A.2 (explaining the Court’s narrow ruling in Fulton). 
 74. Compare Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of 
Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1410 (1990) (concluding that the Free 
Exercise Clause permits the granting of religious exemptions), with Phillip A. Hamburger, A 
Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption:  An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 915, 916–17 (1992) (arguing, in line with Smith, against religious exemptions to 
neutral and generally applicable laws under the Free Exercise Clause). 
 75. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 
and 42 U.S.C.), invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 76. See Christopher C. Lund, RFRA, State RFRAs, and Religious Minorities, 53 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 163, 163 (2016). 
 77. In LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases, religious claimants can typically show 
that their religious beliefs are substantially burdened because they are being forced to choose 
between acting contrary to their faith or violating antidiscrimination law. See, e.g., Brush & 
Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890, 920–21 (Ariz. 2019).  This Note does not 
address the separate area of legal scholarship that closely reviews the substantial burden 
component under RFRA and similar state laws. See generally Abner S. Greene, Religious 
Freedom and (Other) Civil Liberties:  Is There a Middle Ground?, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
161 (2015). 
 78. “The purposes of this chapter are . . . to restore the compelling interest test as set 
forth in Sherbert v. Verner . . . and Wisconsin v. Yoder . . . and to guarantee its application in 
all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) 
(citations omitted). 
 79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a); see, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 
682, 688–89 (2014) (applying strict scrutiny to evaluate the claimant’s claim under RFRA). 
 80. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 81. See id. at 536.  RFRA, as applied to the federal government, stands. See Lund, supra 
note 76, at 164. 
 82. Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 
2000cc-5). 
 83. See Lund, supra note 76, at 163–64.  RLUIPA protects religious institutions and 
houses of worship from discrimination in land use and zoning laws. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000cc(a).  RLUIPA also protects institutionalized persons from religious discrimination. 
Id. § 2000cc-1(a). 
 84. See Lund, supra note 76, at 164; State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT’L 
CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (May 14, 2017), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-
criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx [https://perma.cc/9AG5-4P6U]. 
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protections for religious freedom.85  Echoing RFRA and RLUIPA, state 
RFRAs call for strict scrutiny review when the state substantially burdens 
religion.86  As a result, “the compelling-interest test discarded by Smith 
now again applies to the federal government and more than half the 
states.”87  The relationship between state RFRAs and Smith is one part of a 
multi-faceted battle in LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases.88 
B.  Expanding Protections for LGBTQIA+ Americans 
LGBTQIA+ civil rights stand directly opposite religious liberty in 
LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases.89  As a result of Supreme Court 
decisions and changes to state and local antidiscrimination laws, 
LGBTQIA+ civil rights have greatly expanded since the turn of the 
century.90  First, this section discusses the important role the Supreme 
Court has played in expanding LGBTQIA+ civil rights.  Second, this 
section addresses how state governments have promoted equality for 
LGBTQIA+ Americans by increasing the protections afforded by 
antidiscrimination laws. 
1.  The Supreme Court and LGBTQIA+ Constitutional Rights 
Since the mid-1990s, the Supreme Court has heard only a few cases 
addressing the constitutional rights of LGBTQIA+ individuals, but the 
Court’s decisions have been significant.91  In 1996, the Court was presented 
with the question of whether an amendment to Colorado’s state 
constitution, which rolled back municipal protections for LGBTQIA+ 
individuals, violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.92  
The Court applied rational basis review93 and concluded that the 
amendment was unconstitutional.94 
 
 85. See Lund, supra note 76, at 164.  Alabama is one of the states that has broadly 
construed the religious freedom protections in its state constitution. See ALA. CONST. art. I, 
§ 3.01. 
 86. See Lund, supra note 76, at 164.  Compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-407 (West 2018) 
(“No government entity shall substantially burden a person’s free exercise of religion unless 
it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person is . . . [e]ssential to further a 
compelling governmental interest; and . . . [t]he least restrictive means of furthering that 
compelling governmental interest.”), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (outlining RFRA’s 
legislative purpose). 
 87. Lund, supra note 76, at 164; see also Victoria Cappucci, Note, The Cost of Free 
Speech:  Resolving the Wedding Vendor Divide, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 2585, 2592–93 (2020) 
(discussing the implications of RFRA, RLUIPA, and state RFRAs). 
 88. See infra Parts II.B, II.C. 
 89. See Lydia E. Lavelle, Saving Cake for Dessert:  How Hearing the LGBTQ Title VII 
Cases First Can Inform LGTBQ Public Accommodation Cases, 30 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 
123, 123–24 (2020). 
 90. See id. at 123, 144. 
 91. See id. at 123. 
 92. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623–25 (1996). 
 93. In addressing constitutional questions related to the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Court uses the same standards of constitutional review applied in the First Amendment cases 
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LGBTQIA+ Americans secured another victory at the Supreme Court in 
2003.  In Lawrence v. Texas,95 the Court held that state laws that 
criminalized private consensual sexual conduct between same-sex adults 
were unconstitutional.96  Ten years later in United States v. Windsor,97 the 
Court struck down the definition of marriage in the Defense of Marriage 
Act98 (DOMA) as unconstitutional.99  DOMA defined marriage as the 
“legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife.”100  In 
reaching its decision, the Court noted that “[u]nder DOMA, same-sex 
married couples have their lives burdened, by reason of government decree, 
in visible and public ways.”101 
In 2015, the Court took a monumental step in recognizing a 
constitutionally protected right to same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. 
Hodges.102  The Court declared that the denial to same-sex couples of the 
fundamental right to marry “works a grave and continuing harm” and 
imposes a “disability” that subordinates same-sex couples.103  The Court 
solidified this right to same-sex marriage in Pavan v. Smith104 when it held 
that both members of a same-sex couple have a constitutional right to have 
both of their names listed on their child’s birth certificate.105 
Despite having addressed constitutional questions about LGBTQIA+ 
rights only a handful of times, the Supreme Court’s decisions have greatly 
shaped and expanded protections for LGBTQIA+ Americans.106  As the 
Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to provide more substantive 
rights to LGBTQIA+ Americans, state and local governments have 
followed suit and looked to expand equality for the LGBTQIA+ community 
in their jurisdictions. 
2.  Public Accommodation Laws:  New Protected Classes 
Following the Supreme Court’s example, state and local governments 
have taken important steps to expand protections for LGBTQIA+ 
Americans, mainly through the passage of new or revised public 
 
discussed above. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements of 
rational basis review). 
 94. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635–36 (“We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies 
homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone 
else.”). 
 95. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 96. See id. at 578–79.  The Court overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), a 
prior decision approving of such laws. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578l. 
 97. 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
 98. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 1 
and 28 U.S.C.). 
 99. See Windsor, 570 U.S. at 775. 
 100. 1 U.S.C. § 7, invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
 101. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 772. 
 102. 576 U.S. 644, 679–81 (2015). 
 103. Id. at 675. 
 104. 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017) (per curiam). 
 105. See id. at 2078–79. 
 106. See Lavelle, supra note 89, at 124. 
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accommodation laws.107  Historically, public accommodation laws have 
prohibited discrimination on the basis of the protected classes of race, 
religion, and national origin.108  To expand protections for the LGBTQIA+ 
community, state109 and local110 governments have enlarged the list of 
protected classes to include sexual orientation and, in some places, gender 
identity.111  Federal public accommodation law—namely Title II of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964112 (“Civil Rights Act”)—does not include sexual 
orientation as a protected class.113  Because there is currently no federal law 
that prohibits sexual orientation discrimination in places of public 
accommodation,114 the passage of legislation by state and local 
governments has been significant.115 
 
 107. See Elizabeth Sepper, The Role of Religion in State Public Accommodations Laws, 
60 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 631, 638–39 (2016). 
 108. See id. at 635; see also Lisa Gabrielle Lerman & Annette K. Sanderson, 
Discrimination in Access to Public Places:  A Survey of State and Federal Public 
Accommodations Laws, 7 N.Y.U. L. REV. & SOC. CHANGE 215, 260–61 (1978), 
https://socialchangenyu.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Lisa-Lerman-Annette-
Sanderson_RLSC_7.2.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZFT-BPTN]. 
 109. See State Public Accommodation Laws, supra note 5 (listing California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, 
Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin as jurisdictions that have 
broadened the range of protected classes).  While Michigan has not officially amended its 
public accommodation law, the Michigan Civil Rights Commission interpreted “sex” in the 
state’s current law as covering sexual orientation and gender identity. See, e.g., 
Interpretative Statement Regarding the Meaning of “Sex” in the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights 
Act (Act 453 of 1976), MICH. C.R. COMM’N, https://www.michigan.gov/ 
documents/mdcr/MCRC_Interpretive_Statement_on_Sex_05212018_625067_7.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GL97-LN5J] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021) (interpretive statement adopted on 
May 21, 2018). 
 110. As of January 2018, more than 400 cities and counties have laws in place protecting 
LGBTQIA+ Americans from discrimination in places of public accommodation. See Klint 
W. Alexander, The Masterpiece Cakeshop Decision and the Clash Between 
Nondiscrimination and Religious Freedom, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 1069, 1093 (2019) (citing 
Cities and Counties with Non-Discrimination Ordinances That Include Gender Identity, 
HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/resources/cities-and-counties-with-non-
discrimination-ordinances-that-include-gender [https://perma.cc/JPY3-U77U] (last visited 
Aug. 9, 2021)). 
 111. See Sepper, supra note 107, at 635–36, 638. 
 112. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the 
U.S.C.). 
 113. See Justin Muehlmeyer, Toward a New Age of Consumer Access Rights:  Creating 
Space in the Public Accommodation for the LGBT Community, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 
781, 784 (2013); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (prohibiting discrimination “on the ground of 
race, color, religion, [and] national origin”). 
 114. The Supreme Court recently interpreted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to prohibit 
discrimination in employment on the basis of sexual orientation. See Bostock v. Clayton 
Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020).  The Court’s decision expanded employment 
protections for LGBTQIA+ Americans but did not address the question of discrimination in 
places of public accommodation. 
 115. Congress is currently considering a bill known as the Equality Act, which would 
greatly expand antidiscrimination protections for LGBTQIA+ Americans at the federal level. 
See H.R. 5, 117th Cong. (2021), https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/5 
[https://perma.cc/BK7W-6VLA] (“This bill prohibits discrimination based on sex, sexual 
orientation, and gender identity in areas including public accommodations . . . .”).  The 
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Drafters of antidiscrimination laws originally used “public 
accommodation” to refer to places “other than schools, workplaces, and 
homes.”116  Statutory definitions of public accommodation have broadened 
over time and reflect one of three basic models.117  The first model is 
unique to Title II of the Civil Rights Act, which provides an exclusive list 
of businesses subject to antidiscrimination obligations.118  The second 
model defines public accommodation generally.119  The third model bridges 
the gap between the first two and usually contains some type of exclusive 
list, plus a catch-all provision.120  Regardless of the model used, in most 
states, virtually every entity open to the public constitutes a public 
accommodation, and there are limited exceptions.121  Public 
accommodation laws are neutral and generally applicable laws.122 
The overall purpose of public accommodation laws has been fiercely 
debated,123 and in LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases, the question is 
an important one.124  Some scholars argue that the purpose of 
antidiscrimination law is to expand market access to protected persons who 
historically have not been able to fully enjoy the goods and services of a 
functioning market.125  Others dispute this position, acknowledging that 
 
House passed the Equality Act on February 25, 2021, and the Senate is considering the bill. 
See Grace Segers, Senate Could Expand LGBTQ Protections with Equality Act, CBS NEWS 
(June 10, 2021, 8:50 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/equality-act-lgbtq-protection-
bill-senate/ [https://perma.cc/DW4Y-44FA]. 
 116. Lerman & Sanderson, supra note 108, at 217. 
 117. See Sepper, supra note 107, at 639. 
 118. Id. at 639–40; 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (listing lodgings, eating establishments, gas 
stations, and places of exhibition or entertainment as the categories of public 
accommodations). 
 119. Sepper, supra note 107, at 640.  For example, a public accommodation is “any place, 
store, or other establishment, either licensed or unlicensed, that supplies accommodations, 
good and services . . . .” Id. (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102(7) (2015)). 
 120. Id. at 641–42.  For example, Maine’s public accommodation law contains a list of 
specific categories of public accommodations, followed by a broad definition encompassing 
“[a]ny establishment that . . . offers its goods . . . to . . . the general public.” Id. at 642 
(alteration in original) (quoting ME. STAT. tit. 5, § 4553(8) (1995)). 
 121. Id. at 642. 
 122. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727 
(2018) (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.5 (1968) (per 
curiam)) (“[I]t is a general rule that . . . [religious] objections do not allow business owners 
and other actors in the economy and in society to deny protected persons equal access to 
goods and services under a neutral and generally applicable public accommodations law.”).  
For a general discussion of neutral and generally applicable laws, see supra note 51 and 
accompanying text. 
 123. Compare Berg, supra note 50, at 141–42 (arguing that there are plenty of vendors 
available to ensure that LGBTQIA+ individuals gain access to the market as a whole), with 
Marvin Lim & Louise Melling, Inconvenience or Indignity?:  Religious Exemptions to 
Public Accommodations Laws, 22 J.L. & POL’Y 705, 711 (2014) (arguing that the concept of 
dignity is extremely relevant to the current debate over protecting LGBTQIA+ individuals 
from discrimination). 
 124. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 125. See Andrew Koppelman, You Can’t Hurry Love:  Why Antidiscrimination 
Protections for Gay People Should Have Religious Exemptions, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 125, 133 
(2006) (“Anyone who wants to extend antidiscrimination protection to a new class needs to 
show that the class is subject to discrimination that is so pervasive that markets will not 
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while public accommodation laws address the problem of market access, 
the fundamental purpose of these laws is to dismantle patterns of 
discrimination and ensure human dignity.126 
The various aims of antidiscrimination laws have posed challenges for 
courts in LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases, particularly when 
courts are applying strict scrutiny to determine whether a religious 
exemption should be granted under state law.127  To balance the liberty and 
equality interests in LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases more 
efficiently, courts should consider the government’s goals in enacting 
antidiscrimination laws.128 
II.  LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION LAW 
As previously discussed, public-facing businesses are prohibited under 
public accommodation laws from discriminating on the basis of protected 
classes, including sexual orientation, in many jurisdictions.129  LGBTQIA+ 
public accommodation cases demonstrate the inherent tension between 
liberty and equality when a religious business owner denies services to a 
same-sex couple in violation of public accommodation law.130  While these 
conflicts existed before the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell,131 the 
number of cases rose substantially following the Court’s decision in that 
case.132 
Because of Smith, the Supreme Court has not fully weighed in on the 
core conflict present in LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases.133  As a 
result, state courts have needed to reconcile the competing interests in these 
 
solve the problem.”); see also Nathan Oman, The Empirical Irony of the Conflict Between 
Antidiscrimination and Religious Freedom, L. & RELIGION F. (Apr. 22, 2015), 
https://lawandreligionforum.org/2015/04/22/the-empirical-irony-of-the-conflict-between-
antidiscrimination-and-religious-freedom/ [https://perma.cc/7S32-959X]. 
 126. See Elizabeth Sepper, Gays in the Moralized Marketplace, 7 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. 
REV. 129, 153–54 (2015); see also Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars:  
Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2574–78 
(2015); Lim & Melling, supra note 123, at 713 (“The primary purpose . . . is to solve this 
problem, the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access 
to public establishments.” (omission in original) (quoting S. REP. NO. 88-872, at 2370 
(1964))). 
 127. See infra Part II.C. 
 128. See infra Part III.A. 
 129. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the expanded protections for LGBTQIA+ 
Americans under state antidiscrimination laws). 
 130. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 131. See generally Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013).  For a 
discussion of the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell and other cases involving 
LGBTQIA+ constitutional rights, see supra Part I.B.1. 
 132. See Sepper, supra note 126, at 146 (“2014 and 2015 . . . have seen renewed efforts to 
achieve marriage-related religious exemptions for businesses.”); see also Berg, supra note 
10, at 209; Alexander, supra note 110, at 1106 (“Since the 2015 Obergefell decision, U.S. 
courts have been working to strike the right balance between the promotion 
of LGBT equality and the protection of religious liberty . . . .”). 
 133. See Hollman, supra note 21 (arguing that the Supreme Court has not addressed 
“whether and under what circumstances the Constitution requires an exemption to . . . 
nondiscrimination law more broadly”). 
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cases under state law; this has led to inconsistent results and intensified the 
underlying divide in these cases.134  Part II.A explores the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence in LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases.  Part II.B delves 
into the challenges presented by the current body of religious exemption 
law by examining Smith and state RFRAs more closely.  Part II.C outlines 
the disagreements among courts and scholars about the overall purpose 
public accommodation laws serve, as well as the applicability of the 
third-party harm doctrine. 
A.  The Supreme Court and LGBTQIA+ Public Accommodation Cases 
While the Supreme Court has previously heard LGBTQIA+ public 
accommodation cases, it has not addressed the underlying clash between 
liberty and equality in these cases.135  To reach these broader questions, the 
Court would need to reconsider its holding in Smith, which it was not 
specifically asked to do until Fulton v. City of Philadelphia.136  Part II.A.1 
explains the Court’s decisions in the “wedding vendor” cases.137  Part 
II.A.2 discusses the Court’s missed opportunity in Fulton to address the 
conflict between religious liberty and LGBTQIA+ rights in foster care. 
1.  The Wedding Vendor Cases 
The most well-known LGBTQIA+ public accommodation case to reach 
the Supreme Court is Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission.  In this case, Jack Phillips, the owner of Masterpiece 
Cakeshop and a devout Christian, refused to make a wedding cake for a 
same-sex couple, Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins.138  After being denied 
by Phillips, the couple filed an administrative complaint with the Colorado 
Civil Rights Commission (the “Commission”).139  The Commission found 
that Phillips violated Colorado’s public accommodation law, which 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.140  Phillips 
challenged the antidiscrimination law as applied to his conduct of denying 
the couple services, claiming that the law’s application violated his First 
Amendment free exercise and speech rights.141  The Colorado Court of 
Appeals disagreed with Phillips and upheld the Commission’s ruling.142 
 
 134. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 135. See Hollman, supra note 21; see also Movsesian, supra note 28, at 713. 
 136. 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1881 (2021). 
 137. Since most LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases involve a religious business 
owner refusing to provide goods and services for a same-sex wedding, scholars have coined 
the term “wedding vendor” to characterize these specific cases. See, e.g., Laycock, supra 
note 13, at 50–51.  However, since these cases are expanding beyond wedding vendors, the 
term “wedding vendor” is no longer all-inclusive. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 138. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724 (2018). 
 139. Id. at 1725. 
 140. Id. at 1726. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 1726–27. 
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The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider Phillips’s 
constitutional claims.143  Phillips presented the Court with three questions:  
(1) whether the Commission impermissibly targeted his religious beliefs in 
violation of the Free Exercise Clause; (2) whether he was entitled to an 
exemption under the Free Speech Clause; and (3) whether he was entitled to 
a religious exemption under the Free Exercise Clause.144  The U.S. 
Supreme Court reversed the Colorado Court of Appeals’s decision and 
concluded that the state violated Phillips’s free exercise rights when it 
failed to provide “neutral and respectful consideration” of his religious 
beliefs.145  The Court did not discuss Phillips’s request for a religious 
exemption under the Free Exercise Clause and only briefly considered his 
compelled speech exemption claim.146  Instead, the Court focused nearly all 
of its attention on the Commission’s conduct during its administrative 
review of Phillips’s case.147 
The Court scrutinized commentary made by two commissioners equating 
Phillips’s views regarding same-sex marriage to historical instances where 
religion was used to justify violence and oppression.148  Justice Kennedy, 
writing for the Court, described this conduct as exhibiting “elements of 
clear and impermissible hostility” toward Phillips’s religious beliefs.149  
Turning to Lukumi, the Court concluded that the Commission’s treatment of 
Phillips’s religious beliefs violated the guarantee of neutrality toward 
religion that the Free Exercise Clause requires.150 
To consider Phillips’s claim for a religious exemption under the Free 
Exercise Clause, the Court would have needed to address its controversial 
 
 143. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (mem.). 
 144. Brief for Petitioner at 14–16, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 
S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 3913762, at *14–17.  Because Smith arguably 
stood in the way of Phillips’s most obvious claim for a religious exemption, a majority of the 
briefing in the case focused on his compelled speech argument. Id. at 16–35.  
Unsurprisingly, many claimants in LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases also present 
compelled speech claims. See, e.g., Chelsey Nelson Photography LLC v. 
Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov’t, 479 F. Supp. 3d 543, 548 (W.D. Ky. 2020); State v. 
Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. (Arlene II), 441 P.3d 1203, 1224–28 (Wash. 2019), cert. denied, No. 
19-333, 2021 WL 2742795 (U.S. July 2, 2021) (mem.).  While these compelled speech 
claims present interesting questions, this Note does not specifically address these issues. 
 145. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729. 
 146. Justice Thomas closely analyzed Phillips’s compelled speech claim in his concurring 
opinion. See id. at 1740–48 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 147. See id. at 1729–30 (majority opinion); see also Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra 
note 20, at 133 (observing that the Court in Masterpiece Cakeshop “focused on whether state 
officials treated religious objections with the proper respect and consideration”). 
 148. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729.  During Phillips’s administrative hearing, 
a commissioner stated that “[f]reedom of religion and religion has been used to justify all 
kinds of discrimination throughout history, whether it be slavery, whether it be the 
holocaust . . . .” Id. (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Colo. C.R. Comm’n 
Meeting (May 30, 2014)). 
 149. Id. 
 150. See id. at 1730–31 (discussing the application of Lukumi). 
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holding in Smith.151  While some members of the Court have suggested in 
other contexts that the Court should reconsider Smith,152 the Court was not 
presented with this specific question in Masterpiece Cakeshop.153  The 
Court, therefore, did not reach the underlying free exercise exemption 
issues.154  Notably, the Court acknowledged the inherent clash between 
liberty and equality but did not explicitly address the question of how to 
balance these interests.155 
After Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court was presented with two other 
LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases involving wedding vendors.  In 
State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc.156 (Arlene I), Barronelle Stutzman, the 
owner of Arlene’s Flowers, refused to sell wedding flowers to a same-sex 
couple, Robert Ingersoll and Curt Freed.157  Stutzman requested an 
exemption from Washington’s antidiscrimination law, but her request was 
denied by the state courts.158  Stutzman then petitioned the U.S. Supreme 
Court to hear her constitutional claims.159 
Similarly, in Klein v. Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries,160 
Christian bakers Melissa and Aaron Klein refused to make a wedding cake 
for Rachel and Laurel Bowman-Cryer, a same-sex couple.161  The Oregon 
state courts upheld the Bureau of Labor and Industries’s administrative 
 
 151. See supra Part I.A (discussing Smith and its aftermath).  In his concurring opinion in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Justice Gorsuch pointed out that Smith “remains controversial in 
many quarters.” Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1734 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 152. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 869 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. 
denied, 139 S. Ct. 634 (2019).  In a concurring statement on the denial of certiorari, Justice 
Alito, joined by Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, observed that the Court’s ruling 
in Smith “drastically cut back on the protection provided by the Free Exercise Clause,” but in 
this particular case, the Court “ha[s] not been asked to revisit [Smith].” Id. at 637. 
 153. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 144, at 14–16. 
 154. See Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 20, at 133–34; see also Movsesian, supra 
note 28, at 713 (arguing that Masterpiece Cakeshop “does relatively little to resolve the 
conflict between anti-discrimination laws and the right of business owners to decline, out of 
sincere religious conviction, to provide services in connection with same-sex weddings”); 
Alexander, supra note 110, at 1070. 
 155. Justice Kennedy opened the Court’s opinion by recognizing the difficult questions 
related to the “proper reconciliation” of a state’s authority to protect LGBTQIA+ Americans 
from discrimination “when they seek goods or services” and the right of “all persons to 
exercise fundamental freedoms under the First Amendment.” Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 
S. Ct. at 1723.  Justice Kennedy closed the Court’s opinion with the following statement:  
“[T]hese disputes must be resolved with tolerance, without undue disrespect to sincere 
religious beliefs, and without subjecting gay persons to indignities when they seek goods and 
services in an open market.” Id. at 1732. 
 156. 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018) 
(mem.). 
 157. Id. at 549. 
 158. Id. at 551, 568–69. 
 159. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2–5, Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 138 
S. Ct. 2671 (2018) (No. 17-108), 2017 WL 3126218, at *1–5. 
 160. 410 P.3d 1051 (Or. Ct. App. 2017), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 139 S. Ct. 2713 
(2019) (mem.). 
 161. Id. at 1057.  Rachel was “hysterical” when Klein told her that they do not make 
cakes for same-sex weddings. Id. 
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ruling that the Kleins violated Oregon’s public accommodation law.162  
Like Stutzman and Phillips, the Kleins sought review by the U.S. Supreme 
Court.163  In both cases, the Court vacated the judgments, directing the state 
courts to reconsider their decisions in light of Masterpiece Cakeshop.164  As 
such, the Court did not address the broader free exercise issues. 
2.  Foster Care:  The Supreme Court’s Missed Opportunity 
In its October 2020 term, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in 
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, an LGBTQIA+ public accommodation case 
involving a new challenger, a religious foster care agency.165  The Fulton 
case presented the Court with the specific question about whether to 
reconsider Smith, but it sidestepped a ripe opportunity to address the clash 
between religious liberty and LGBTQIA+ rights.166 
In Fulton, Catholic Social Services (CSS)167 challenged the Fair 
Practices Ordinance,168 Philadelphia’s public accommodation law, on the 
grounds that the law, as applied, violates its rights under the Free Exercise 
Clause.169  CSS is one of thirty agencies that contracts with the City of 
Philadelphia to provide foster and adoption services.170  CSS’s contract 
with the city contained language specifically incorporating the Fair 
Practices Ordinance, which prohibits discrimination based on sexual 
 
 162. See id. at 1087. 
 163. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14, Klein v. Or. Bureau of Lab. & Indus., 139 S. Ct. 
2713 (2019) (No. 18-547), 2018 WL 5308156, at *15. 
 164. See generally Klein v. Or. Bureau of Lab. & Indus., 139 S. Ct. 2713 (2019); 
Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018).  On remand from the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the Washington Supreme Court reaffirmed its judgment and denied 
Stutzman a religious exemption. See Arlene II, 441 P.3d 1203, 1209–10 (Wash. 2019), cert. 
denied, No. 19-333, 2021 WL 2742795 (U.S. July 2, 2021) (mem.).  The court pointed out 
that the Supreme Court in Masterpiece Cakeshop “did not reconcile” the principles of free 
exercise of religion and the government’s interest in protecting LGBTQIA+ rights. Id. at 
1215.  Stutzman filed another petition for certiorari, which the Supreme Court denied. 
Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, No. 19-333, 2021 WL 2742795 (U.S. July 2, 2021) 
(mem.). 
 165. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1871 (2021).  Many scholars 
foreshadowed the emergence of these new types of cases. See Berg, supra note 10, at 211.  
These new conflicts with foster care and adoption agencies are intensifying. See, e.g., Buck 
v. Gordon, 959 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 2020); New Home Fam. Servs., Inc. v. Poole, 387 
F. Supp. 3d 194 (N.D.N.Y. 2019), rev’d, 966 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2020). 
 166. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1926 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“A majority of our colleagues, 
however, seek to sidestep the question [of whether to overrule Smith].”). 
 167. CSS is a religious nonprofit organization affiliated with the Archdiocese of 
Philadelphia. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140, 147 (3d Cir. 2019), rev’d, 141 
S. Ct. 1868 (2021).  CSS has been serving the Philadelphia community since 1917 and views 
its foster care work as part of its “religious mission.” Id. 
 168. PHILA., PA., CODE § 9-1101 (2021). 
 169. Fulton, 922 F.3d at 152. 
 170. Id. at 147.  When a child in need of foster care comes into the city’s custody, the 
Department of Health and Human Services refers that child to one of the agencies with 
which it has a contractual relationship, such as CSS. Id. 
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orientation in places of public accommodation.171  Therefore, CSS was 
required to certify same-sex couples as foster parents, a practice CSS 
argued violated its sincerely held religious beliefs.172 
The Department of Health and Human Services (“Human Services”) 
opened an investigation into CSS after the Philadelphia Inquirer reported 
that CSS “would not work with same-sex couples as foster parents.”173  
After several attempts to resolve the underlying conflict, Human Services 
notified CSS that it would no longer make referrals to CSS or enter into 
future contracts with the agency unless CSS assured it would certify 
same-sex couples as foster parents.174  CSS, along with three of its foster 
parents—Sharonell Fulton, Cecilia Paul, and Toni Lynn Simms-Busch—
filed suit in federal court seeking injunctive relief.175  The district court 
denied the agency’s request for injunctive relief,176 and the Third Circuit 
upheld the decision on appeal.177 
The Third Circuit focused its inquiry on whether Human Services’s 
administrative investigation inappropriately targeted CSS’s religious 
beliefs.178  In support of its claim that the city acted out of religious 
hostility, CSS pointed to statements made by Human Services 
Commissioner Cynthia Figueroa about “following the teachings of Pope 
Francis.”179  While CSS characterized this commentary as improper, the 
court found that there was no evidence that “the City treated CSS 
differently because of its religion.”180 
 
 171. Id. at 148.  In addition to incorporating the Fair Practices Ordinance, CSS’s contract 
contained standalone antidiscrimination provisions. Id.  The Supreme Court closely analyzed 
these contractual provisions in its decision. See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 
1868, 1878–80 (2021). 
 172. See Fulton, 922 F.3d at 147–49. 
 173. Id. at 148; see Julia Terruso, Two Foster Agencies in Philly Won’t Place Kids with 
LGBTQ People, PHILA. INQUIRER (Mar. 13, 2018, 9:02 AM), https://www.inquirer.com/ 
philly/news/foster-adoption-lgbtq-gay-same-sex-philly-bethany-archdiocese-20180313.html 
[https://perma.cc/2HT8-RM77]. 
 174. See Fulton, 922 F.3d at 150. 
 175. Id. at 150–51. CSS also requested a religious exemption to the city’s 
antidiscrimination policies under the Free Exercise Clause and filed a Masterpiece 
Cakeshop-type claim alleging that Human Services impermissibly targeted its religious 
beliefs. See id. at 156–57. 
 176. Id. at 151. 
 177. Id. at 165. 
 178. Id. at 156.  The Third Circuit dismissed CSS’s argument that the city’s 
antidiscrimination policies are not neutral and generally applicable. See id. at 158 (“The Fair 
Practices Ordinance has not been gerrymandered as in Lukumi . . . .”).  The Supreme Court 
disagreed. See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1881 (2021) (holding that the 
city’s actions are subject to ‘the most rigorous of scrutiny’” (quoting Church of the Lukumi 
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993))). 
 179. Fulton, 922 F.3d at 157. 
 180. Id.  In this regard, the Third Circuit’s decision closely mirrors Masterpiece 
Cakeshop.  Although Jack Phillips asserted an exemption claim under the Free Exercise 
Clause and Free Speech Clause, the Supreme Court did not extensively consider his 
exemption claims because of Smith. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.  Instead, the 
Court’s decision centered on the state’s hostility toward Phillips’s religious beliefs, which is 
conduct barred by the Free Exercise Clause. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. 
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1731 (2018). 
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Following the Third Circuit’s ruling, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to hear CSS’s constitutional claims.181  In its briefing, CSS 
explicitly presented the Court with the question of whether Smith should be 
revisited.182  With the Smith question teed up, the Court had an opportunity 
to consider the true conflict in LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases but 
“[d]odg[ed] the question.”183  Instead, the Court concluded that “[t]his case 
falls outside Smith because the City has burdened the religious exercise of 
CSS through policies that do not meet the requirement of being neutral and 
generally applicable.”184 
The Court closely scrutinized a provision of CSS’s contract that provides 
the Human Services commissioner with discretionary authority to grant 
exceptions from the city’s antidiscrimination policies.185  Relying on the 
Sherbert Quartet, the Court concluded that the “inclusion of a formal 
system of entirely discretionary exceptions . . . renders the contractual 
nondiscrimination requirement not generally applicable.”186  The Court 
proceeded to apply strict scrutiny and concluded that the city failed to 
demonstrate a compelling reason for denying CSS a religious exemption.187 
Because the Court in Fulton sidestepped the question of whether to 
overrule Smith, it missed a ripe opportunity to resolve the ongoing conflict 
 
 181. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (2020). 
 182. Brief for Petitioners at 37–50, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (2020) 
(No. 19-123), 2020 WL 2836494, at *37–52.  CSS also asked the Court to consider whether 
the city’s antidiscrimination policies are neutral and generally applicable. See id. at 20–30, 
2020 WL 2836494, at *23–30. 
 183. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1931 (Gorsuch, J., concurring); see 
also id. at 1888 (Alito, J., concurring) (“Not only is the Court’s decision unlikely to resolve 
the present dispute, it provides no guidance regarding similar controversies in other 
jurisdictions.”). 
 184. Id. at 1877 (majority opinion); see also id. at 1883 (Barrett, J., concurring) (“[T]he 
government contract at issue provides for individualized exemptions from its 
nondiscrimination rule, thus triggering strict scrutiny . . . .  I therefore see no reason to 
decide in this case whether Smith should be overruled, much less what should replace it.”). 
 185. Id. at 1878 (majority opinion).  Section 3.21 of CSS’s foster care contract provides, 
in relevant part, that CSS “shall not reject . . . prospective foster or adoptive parents . . . 
based upon . . . their . . . sexual orientation . . . unless an exception is granted by the 
Commissioner or the Commissioner’s designee, in his/her sole discretion.” Id. 
 186. Id.  The Court adopted Justice Scalia’s interpretation of the Sherbert Quartet from 
Smith:  “[T]he unemployment benefits law in Sherbert was not generally applicable because 
the ‘good cause’ standard permitted the government to grant exemptions based on the 
circumstances underlying each application.” Id. at 1877 (citing Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. 
Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990)); see also supra Part 1.A (discussing the Sherbert 
Quartet). 
 187. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1881–82.  Separately, the Court concluded that the Fair 
Practices Ordinance does not apply to foster care certification services. Id. at 1880.  
According to the Court, “[c]ertification as a foster parent . . . is not readily accessible to the 
public” and, therefore, does not constitute a public accommodation. Id.  But see id. at 1927 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring) (arguing that foster agencies, like public colleges and universities, 
qualify as public accommodations under the Fair Practices Ordinance despite engaging in 
“customized and selective assessment[s]”).  Importantly, as Justice Alito observed, the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of state law is not binding on state courts. See id. at 1887 
n.21 (Alito, J., concurring).  In other words, the majority’s characterization of foster care 
certification services is not binding precedent. Id. 
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between expanded LGBTQIA+ rights and religious liberty in LGBTQIA+ 
public accommodation cases.188 
B.  Religious Exemption Doctrine:  A Patchwork of Problems 
With the Supreme Court providing limited guidance on how to address 
the conflicts in LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases, lower courts have 
tackled the challenging issues independently.189  The results have been 
inconsistent.  Exemptions have been denied in most cases190 but granted in 
others.191  These inconsistencies are a product of current religious 
exemption law.192  Because Smith effectively blocks a religious claimant’s 
request for an exemption under the Free Exercise Clause, lower courts are 
frequently presented with compelled speech claims, and some have 
explicitly admitted that they are unsure what framework to apply.193  As it 
stands now, the doctrinal framework in place—Smith for constitutional 
exemption claims and the compelling interest test under state RFRAs—is a 
poor fit to balance both the liberty and equality interests in LGBTQIA+ 
 
 188. Id. at 1931 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Dodging the [Smith] question today 
guarantees it will recur tomorrow.  These cases will keep coming until the Court musters the 
fortitude to supply an answer.”). 
 189. See generally Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890 (Ariz. 
2019). 
 190. See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 75 (N.M. 2013) (holding 
that a wedding photographer was not entitled to a religious exemption because, under Smith, 
New Mexico’s antidiscrimination law is neutral and generally applicable); Gifford v. 
McCarthy, 23 N.Y.S.3d 422, 430 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (holding that a wedding catering 
hall was not entitled to a religious exemption because, under Smith, New York’s 
antidiscrimination law is neutral and generally applicable); 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 385 
F. Supp. 3d 1147, 1162–63 (D. Colo. 2019) (holding that a wedding website designer was 
not entitled to a religious exemption because, under Smith, Colorado’s antidiscrimination 
law is neutral and generally applicable), aff’d No. 19-1413, 2021 WL 3157635 (10th Cir. 
July 26, 2021). 
 191. See Brush & Nib Studio, 448 P.3d at 927.  The Arizona Supreme Court granted the 
designers of custom wedding invitations a religious exemption under Arizona’s state RFRA. 
Id.; see also Chelsey Nelson Photography LLC v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov’t, 
479 F. Supp. 3d 543, 565 (W.D. Ky. 2020) (allowing the claimant to proceed on her 
compelled speech exemption claim but opting not to address the free exercise claim likely 
because of Smith); Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 760 (8th Cir. 2019) 
(permitting the claimant’s free exercise exemption claim to proceed on a hybrid rights theory 
in conjunction with compelled speech). 
 192. Scholars on both sides of the liberty-versus-equality debate have alluded to the 
inconsistencies in religious exemption law. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 10, at 845 
(characterizing religious exemption law as a “confusing and rather ragtag body of law”); 
Movsesian, supra note 28, at 715–16 (noting that religious exemption law is “currently 
something of a patchwork”). 
 193. See, e.g., Dep’t of Fair Emp. & Housing v. Miller, No. BCV-17-102855, 2018 WL 
747835, at *5 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2018).  The court denied the claimant’s request for an 
exemption from California’s antidiscrimination law but on compelled speech grounds.  The 
court observed that “[i]t is difficult to say what standard of scrutiny . . . should [be] use[d] to 
evaluate the application of the Free Exercise clause to the circumstances of this case after 
[Smith].” Id. 
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public accommodation cases.194  Part II.B.1 discusses the challenges 
presented by Smith.  Part II.B.2 outlines the obstacles created by statutory 
religious exemption law, specifically focusing on state RFRAs. 
1.  The Smith Hurdle 
The Supreme Court in Smith held that “generally applicable, 
religion-neutral laws that have the effect of burdening a particular religious 
practice need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest.”195  
As previously discussed, the Court adopted rational basis review as the 
level of scrutiny applicable to religious exemption claims under the Free 
Exercise Clause.196  Following Smith, compelling interest review is only 
warranted when a law lacks neutrality or is not generally applicable.197 
Under Smith, a claimant’s request for a religious exemption from a 
neutral and generally applicable law usually will not be granted.198  When 
courts apply rational basis review, the government almost always prevails 
because the burden of proof under rational basis review is substantially less 
demanding than the burden of proof under strict scrutiny.199  Under rational 
basis review, the government must simply demonstrate that its policies are 
rationally related to a legitimate interest, which it can almost always 
prove.200 
In LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases, business owners’ 
constitutional religious exemption claims are subject to rational basis 
review under Smith.201  The Smith doctrine applies because the religious 
claimant is seeking an exemption under the Free Exercise Clause from a 
religion-neutral antidiscrimination law.202  However, the application of 
Smith in these cases proves to be problematic.  Since the rational basis 
framework is so deferential to the government’s interests, the religious 
 
 194. See Loewentheil, supra note 52, at 465 (“[N]either the neutral and generally 
applicable standard of Smith nor the substantial-burden standard of [state RFRAs] asks the 
right questions or produces the right answers in a consistent manner.”). 
 195. Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3 (1990). 
 196. See id.  Prior to Smith, the Court analyzed religious exemptions claims under strict 
scrutiny. See, e.g., Thomas v. Rev. Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (“The state may justify an 
inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some 
compelling state interest.”); see also supra Part I.A. (explaining the standard of review under 
the Free Exercise Clause after Smith). 
 197. See Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1296 (2021) (per curiam); Roman Cath. 
Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 67 (2020) (per curiam); Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993). 
 198. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1734 
(2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“[A] neutral and generally applicable law will usually 
survive a constitutional free exercise challenge.”); see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 897–99. 
 199. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 45, at 587 (explaining the government’s burden of 
proof under rational basis review). 
 200. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (upholding state 
regulations of the sale of eyeglass frames under rational basis review). 
 201. See, e.g., Arlene II, 441 P.3d 1203, 1231–32 (Wash. 2019), cert. denied, No. 19-333, 
2021 WL 2742795 (U.S. July 2, 2021) (mem.). 
 202. See id.; see also supra Part I.A (discussing free exercise jurisprudence after Smith). 
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claimants almost always lose.203  Because LGBTQIA+ public 
accommodation cases involve questions about fundamental religious 
liberty, scholars in favor of religious exemptions criticize the Smith 
framework for failing to account for the interests of the religious claimants 
seeking exemptions.204 
To get around the Smith hurdle, religious claimants have shifted efforts 
toward attacking antidiscrimination statutes as not being neutral and 
generally applicable.205  In doing so, religious claimants aim to convince 
the court that it should apply strict scrutiny under Lukumi.206  To show that 
a law is not neutral and generally applicable, claimants will look to see 
whether the law has any type of existing secular exemptions.207  Typically, 
the more secular exemptions a law has, the stronger the claimant’s 
argument is that the government treats secular exemptions more favorably 
than religious ones.208  The Free Exercise Clause prohibits the government 
from favoring secular activity over religious activity.209 
Religious claimants in LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases are 
usually unsuccessful in arguing that the government’s antidiscrimination 
policies are not neutral and generally applicable.210  As previously 
discussed, public accommodation laws apply to almost all public-facing 
businesses with a limited number of exceptions.211  Courts have typically 
 
 203. See Mark R. Killenbeck, Pandora’s Cake, 72 ARK. L. REV. 769, 809 (2020) (“The 
highly deferential standard articulated in Smith is almost certainly inadequate to the task of 
balancing the competing interests posed by a case like Masterpiece Cakeshop.”); see also 
Loewentheil, supra note 52, at 474 (discussing how Smith “insulate[s] from review 
situations in which the government could provide an accommodation that satisfies the rights 
of all parties, but is not required to do so”). 
 204. See Douglas Laycock & Steven T. Collis, Generally Applicable Law and the Free 
Exercise of Religion, 95 NEB. L. REV. 1, 26 (2016) (proclaiming that First Amendment rights 
are fundamental and deserving of the highest level of protection); see also Berg, supra note 
50, at 109 (“[F]ree exercise of religion has an elevated place in . . . the modern constitutional 
framework . . . .”). 
 205. See Christopher C. Lund, A Matter of Constitutional Luck:  The General 
Applicability Requirement in Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 627, 
628 (2003).  This strategy has been termed the “key” toward bringing a successful 
constitutional exemption claim under the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 633.  While there is a 
separate area of legal scholarship addressing the topic of neutral and generally applicable 
laws, this Note discusses this topic only in the context of highlighting Smith’s doctrinal 
challenges. 
 206. As previously discussed, courts only apply strict scrutiny after Smith if the 
challenged law is found to lack neutrality or not be generally applicable. See Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993). 
 207. See Laycock & Collis, supra note 204, at 5–6. 
 208. See Lund, supra note 205, at 638. 
 209. See Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1296 (2021) (per curiam) (holding that 
government regulations are not neutral and generally applicable “whenever they treat any 
comparable secular activity more favorably than religious exercise”); Roman Cath. Diocese 
of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 66 (2020) (per curiam). 
 210. See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 74 (N.M. 2013).  But see 
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1881 (2021) (holding that Philadelphia’s 
“non-discrimination requirement imposes a burden on CSS’s religious exercise and does not 
qualify as generally applicable”). 
 211. See Sepper, supra note 107, at 642. 
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concluded that public accommodation laws are neutral laws of general 
applicability.212  Further, courts have found that a small number of secular 
exemptions is not enough to show that the government has singled out 
religion for disparate treatment in its public accommodation laws.213 
While attacking the presumption of neutrality and general applicability 
has worked in other free exercise cases,214 this strategy has usually not been 
successful in LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases.215  As such, 
religious claimants are effectively stuck under the Smith umbrella when 
they bring constitutional religious exemption claims.216  Therefore, the 
equality interest, embodied through the state’s antidiscrimination laws, 
usually prevails over the religious liberty interest when religious exemption 
claims are analyzed under Smith. 
2.  The State RFRAs Hurdle 
Because Smith makes it difficult for a claimant to succeed on a 
constitutional religious exemption claim, these individuals instead look to 
bring their religious exemption claims under state RFRAs.217  State RFRAs 
are a product of the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Boerne v. Flores, 
in which the Court invalidated RFRA as applied to the states.218  Most state 
RFRAs mirror RFRA and reinstate the pre-Smith strict scrutiny test, as 
applied in Yoder and the Sherbert Quartet, when the government 
substantially burdens religion.219  In certain jurisdictions, there are state 
 
 212. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 
557, 572 (1995) (holding that public accommodations laws do not generally violate the First 
Amendment); 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, No. 19-1413, 2021 WL 3157635, at *13–14 (10th 
Cir. July 26, 2021); Arlene II, 441 P.3d 1203, 1231 (Wash. 2019), cert. denied, No. 19-333, 
2021 WL 2742795 (U.S. July 2, 2021) (mem.). 
 213. See, e.g., 303 Creative LLC, 2021 WL 3157635, at *15–17; Arlene II, 441 P.3d. at 
1229–31; Gifford v. McCarthy, 23 N.Y.S. 3d 422, 430 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (“The fact that 
some religious organizations and educational facilities are exempt from the statute’s public 
accommodation provision does not, as petitioners claim, demonstrate that it is not neutral or 
generally applicable.”). 
 214. See, e.g., Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1296 (2021) (per curiam); Fraternal 
Order of Police v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 366–67 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that the 
Newark Police Department’s facial hair policy was not neutral and generally applicable 
because it contained exceptions for medical reasons but not religious reasons). 
 215. See, e.g., Arlene II, 441 P.3d at 1229–30 (rejecting Stutzman’s argument that 
Washington’s public accommodation law is not neutral and generally applicable). 
 216. See Lund, supra note 205, at 628. 
 217. See, e.g., Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890, 918 (Ariz. 
2019) (“Here, Plaintiffs concede the [antidiscrimination] Ordinance is a facially neutral law 
of general applicability. . . .  As a result, their free exercise [exemption] claim is based solely 
on [Arizona’s state RFRA].” (citations omitted)); Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 
140, 162 (3d Cir. 2019), rev’d, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021). 
 218. 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997).  For more information on the passage of RFRA and its 
implications, see supra Part I.A. 
 219. See Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales:  A Look at State RFRAs, 
55 S.D. L. REV. 466, 474–77 (2010). 
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RFRAs and public accommodation laws, which create a direct statutory 
conflict.220 
When strict scrutiny is applied, the religious claimant has a greater 
chance of being granted an exemption, since the government must justify its 
conduct by showing its means are narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling 
interest.221  The government’s burden under strict scrutiny is significant.222 
While the Smith test gives substantial deference to the state, the 
compelling interest test places significant weight on the religious interest 
and relatively little emphasis on the government’s interest in protecting 
LGBTQIA+ rights.223  What makes things even more complicated is 
courts’ and scholars’ disagreement over what the proper application of the 
test is and, more specifically, what the correct formulation of the 
government’s compelling interest is.224  Further, courts have different 
understandings of how third-party harms should factor into their 
analyses.225 
C.  Compelling Interests and Third-Party Harms Under State RFRAs 
Expanding on the doctrinal challenges presented above, this section 
focuses specifically on state RFRAs and discusses the disagreement among 
courts and scholars over the purpose served by public accommodation law, 
as well as the applicability of the third-party harm doctrine.  In outlining 
these disagreements, this section demonstrates how these different 
understandings affect the compelling interest test under state RFRAs and 
lead to inconsistent results in LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases.226  
 
 220. For example, Philadelphia has a public accommodation law that prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. See PHILA., PA., CODE § 9-1106 (2021), 
https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/philadelphia/latest/philadelphia_pa/0-0-0-195838 
[https://perma.cc/4QFK-SYKP].  Pennsylvania has a state RFRA. See 71 PA. STAT. AND 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2401 (West 2021).  The direct clash between these two laws is 
illustrated in Fulton, as CSS also raised a religious exemption claim under Pennsylvania’s 
state RFRA. See Fulton, 922 F.3d at 162–65. 
 221. Loewentheil, supra note 52, at 496 (acknowledging that strict scrutiny is an “easier 
standard for a religious objector to satisfy”). 
 222. See id.; see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 727–28 (2014) 
(characterizing the state’s burden under RFRA as “exceptionally demanding”).  Although 
Hobby Lobby involved a claim under RFRA, the Supreme Court’s application of the 
compelling interest test is helpful to consider when thinking about state RFRAs because they 
closely track RFRA. See Lund, supra note 219, at 474–76. 
 223. Freeman, supra note 47, at 17 (“By applying strict judicial scrutiny . . . a preference 
would be given to religion over non-religion in determining whether exemptions from 
neutral laws of general applicability should be recognized.”); see also Laycock, supra note 
12, at 378 (charactering state RFRAs as having a “substantial thumb on the scale in favor of 
religious liberty”). 
 224. See Movsesian, supra note 28, at 715–16 (discussing the significant difficulties 
presented by the compelling interest test); Killenbeck, supra note 203, at 809 (same); see 
also infra Part II.C.1. 
 225. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 226. While this section is focused specifically on state RFRAs, as discussed previously, 
courts also apply strict scrutiny when analyzing certain constitutional claims under the Free 
Exercise Clause. See supra Part I.A (discussing Lukumi and Sherbert). 
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Part II.C.1 presents the various understandings of the aims of public 
accommodation laws, noting how each different purpose affects the 
analysis under the compelling interest test.  Part II.C.2 explains the 
third-party harm doctrine and discusses points of disagreement among 
courts and scholars over the role third-party harms should play in the 
compelling interest test. 
1.  Market Access or Protection of Personal Dignity:  Is Your Interest 
Compelling? 
Most state RFRAs call for the government to satisfy strict scrutiny when 
it substantially burdens religious exercise.227  The government must show 
that the law furthers a compelling government interest and is the least 
restrictive means of achieving that interest.228  In LGBTQIA+ public 
accommodation cases where religious claimants are seeking exemptions 
from antidiscrimination laws, the two-prong test is as follows:  (1) whether 
the antidiscrimination law furthers a compelling government interest and 
(2) whether denying the claimant’s request for a religious exemption, and 
applying the law uniformly to his or her conduct, is the least restrictive 
means of furthering the compelling governmental interest. 
Regarding the compelling interest question, proponents of religious 
exemptions argue that the overall purpose of public accommodation laws is 
to ensure material access to goods and services.229  These scholars contend 
that public accommodation laws are “justified where there are threats to the 
ability of gay citizens to participate fully and meaningfully in the 
market.”230  In other words, public accommodation laws are a tool for the 
government to increase access to consumer markets and improve economic 
opportunities.231 
Others claim that antidiscrimination laws target “more than material 
inequality.”232  The compelling interest served by these laws goes beyond 
fostering access to the market and centers on eradicating the 
“institutionalized humiliation” that is the central harm of discrimination.233  
In support of their position, these scholars point out that the Supreme Court 
 
 227. See, e.g., Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890, 919 (Ariz. 
2019); see also supra Part II.B.2 (outlining the compelling interest test under state RFRAs). 
 228. Brush & Nib Studio, 448 P.3d at 919–20. 
 229. See Koppelman, supra note 125, at 133; see also Berg, supra note 50, at 141; Oman, 
supra note 125. 
 230. Oman, supra note 125. 
 231. See Koppelman, supra note 125, at 133 (“Antidiscrimination law can have a 
powerful effect on economic opportunity.”). 
 232. Sepper, supra note 126, at 153; see also Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 20, at 
158 (arguing that the market access position “attacks a fundamental aspect of civil rights 
doctrine and rejects decades of experience with public accommodations laws”). 
 233. Sepper, supra note 126, at 154; see also Brief for Respondent Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission at 56–58, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 
(2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 4838416, at *56–59 (arguing that Colorado has a compelling 
interest in applying its antidiscrimination law to protect against the dignitary harms that 
follow from denials of services based on sexual orientation). 
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has recognized the dignitary harm caused by discrimination in both its 
public accommodation234 and LGBTQIA+ civil rights cases.235  More 
importantly, the Court has long held that in light of these dignitary harms, 
the government has a compelling interest in enforcing public 
accommodation laws in a commercial setting, despite religious 
objections.236 
After formulating a compelling interest, courts will turn to the second 
portion of the strict scrutiny test:  the least restrictive means analysis.237  If 
courts understand the government’s compelling interest in passing 
antidiscrimination laws as market access, it follows that uniform 
enforcement of the law is not the least restrictive means of achieving the 
government’s goals if the “same-sex couple seeking goods or services . . . 
can readily obtain comparable goods or services from other providers.”238  
Put differently, the government would not meet its burden of proof under 
strict scrutiny because a less restrictive means exists—requiring the 
same-sex couple to find another willing provider—to further its market 
access goal.239  Because of the existence of market alternatives, religious 
claimants contend that they should not be required to serve LGBTQIA+ 
couples in violation of their religious beliefs.240 
However, if courts frame the compelling interest served by public 
accommodation laws as protecting individual dignity by eradicating 
discrimination, then the government has a stronger argument that the least 
restrictive means of furthering its goal is to require uniform enforcement of 
the public accommodation law and, thus, to deny exemptions.241  Some 
 
 234. See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984); Heart of Atlanta Motel, 
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) (holding that the “fundamental object” of 
antidiscrimination law is to prevent the “deprivation of personal dignity that surely 
accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments”). 
 235. In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court clearly stated that the state has the authority to 
“protect the rights and dignity of gay persons who are, or wish to be, married but who face 
discrimination when they seek goods or services.” 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 (2018).  The Court 
expressed the same sentiment three years earlier in Obergefell, emphasizing that same-sex 
couples “ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law.” 576 U.S. 644, 681 (2015). 
 236. See Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 20, at 159–60; see also Bob Jones Univ. 
v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983); Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 260–61; Brief of 
Amici Curiae Public Accommodation Law Scholars in Support of Respondents at 1–3, 27–
33, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 5127312, at *1–
4, *27–34 [hereinafter Brief of Public Accommodation Law Scholars]. 
 237. Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890, 919–20 (Ariz. 2019); see 
also supra Parts I.A, II.B.2. 
 238. See Brief of Douglas Laycock et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5, 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, and 14-574), 
2015 WL 1048450, at *5. 
 239. Berg, supra note 50, at 137; see also Sepper, supra note 107, at 669. 
 240. See Berg, supra note 50, at 138.  But cf. Brief of Public Accommodation Law 
Scholars, supra note 236, at 33 (“If [the petitioner’s] view [on market access] were correct, 
Colorado’s law would apply only in those locales where alternatives are unavailable to 
particular protected classes—a standard that would be unworkable for businesses, customers, 
and courts.”). 
 241. See Sepper, supra note 107, at 669.  There is an open question of how the 
government can demonstrate that requiring uniformity is the least restrictive means of 
290 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
scholars have taken the position that the government’s interest in preventing 
dignitary harm is so compelling that religious exemptions should rarely, if 
ever, be granted.242  To that end, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that 
“there may be instances in which a need for uniformity precludes the 
recognition of exceptions to generally applicable laws.”243 
2.  Should Religious Exemptions Be Granted When a Third Party Is 
Harmed? 
In addition to disagreeing about the purpose served by public 
accommodation laws, courts and scholars also differ in their understandings 
of how third-party harms244 should factor into the strict scrutiny analysis.245  
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc.,246 legal scholarship has devoted significant attention to whether, or to 
what extent, courts can grant religious exemptions that impose harms on 
third parties.247  In Hobby Lobby, the majority found that when applying 
RFRA, “courts must take adequate account of the burdens a requested 
 
reaching its compelling ends.  As such, each case requires a careful analysis of various 
factors, including the government’s stated goals. See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 126, at 
2581 (“If granting a religious accommodation would harm those protected by the 
antidiscrimination law or undermine societal values and goals the statute promotes, then 
unencumbered enforcement of the statute is the least restrictive means of achieving the 
govern-government’s [sic] compelling ends.”). 
 242. See, e.g., Louise Melling, Religious Refusals to Public Accommodations Laws:  
Four Reasons to Say No, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 177, 192 (2015); Sepper, supra note 126, 
at 165 (arguing that LGBTQIA+ Americans “may face a prolonged period of continued 
discrimination across . . . public accommodations” if religious exemptions are continually 
granted); Lim & Melling, supra note 123, at 724 (“[Courts] should greet any calls for 
exemptions motivated by religious beliefs with great skepticism.”). 
 243. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 436 
(2006); see also United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258–59 (1982) (finding that the 
government’s interest in “assuring mandatory and continuous participation in . . . the social 
security system is very high”). 
 244. In LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases, the third-party harm would be the harm 
suffered by the LGBTQIA+ couple when the religious business owner declines to provide 
services on religious grounds. 
 245. The third-party harm doctrine presents interesting Establishment Clause questions. 
See, e.g., Mark Storslee, Religious Accommodation, The Establishment Clause, and 
Third-Party Harms, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 934 (2019).  However, this Note does not 
address these issues. 
 246. 573 U.S. 682 (2014).  In Hobby Lobby, David and Barbara Green, owners of Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc., a for-profit corporation, challenged the application of the Affordable 
Care Act’s contraception mandate as a violation of their sincerely held religious beliefs. Id. 
at 689–90, 703–04.  The Greens brought their claim under RFRA. Id. 
 247. See Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 20, at 157.  Compare NELSON TEBBE, 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE 49–51 (2017) (arguing that the third-party 
harm doctrine is rooted in First Amendment jurisprudence), and Frederick Mark Gedicks & 
Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate:  An 
Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 343, 357–60 
(2014) (same), with Thomas C. Berg, Religious Exemptions and Third-Party Harms, 
FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV., Oct. 2016, at 50, 51 (criticizing the third-party harm doctrine), and 
Richard W. Garnett, Accommodation, Establishment, and Freedom of Religion, 67 VAND. L. 
REV. EN BANC 39, 45–46 (2014) (same). 
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accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries,”248 and “that 
consideration will often inform the analysis of the Government’s 
compelling interest and the availability of a less restrictive means of 
advancing that interest.”249  The concurring and dissenting justices 
articulated a similar principle, citing the Court’s free exercise precedents.250 
Scholars have questioned whether the Supreme Court’s holding in Hobby 
Lobby creates a firm rule that religious exemptions may not be granted if 
nonbeneficiaries are harmed.251  Even if there is no categorical rule that 
religious exemptions are prohibited when third parties are harmed, at 
minimum, there is support for the position that courts should consider the 
harm to a nonbeneficiary when deciding whether to grant a religious 
exemption.252  To that end, Professors Nelson Tebbe and Frederick Mark 
Gedicks have proposed interesting frameworks for courts to use when 
considering the effect of third-party harms.253 
 
 248. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 729 n.37 (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 
(2005)). 
 249. Id.; see also Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, Of Burdens and 
Baselines, Hobby Lobby’s Puzzling Footnote 37, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY 323, 323–24 (Micah Schwartzman et al. eds., 2016) (outlining the Supreme Court’s 
discussion of third-party harms in Hobby Lobby). 
 250. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined in relevant part by Justices Breyer, Kagan, and 
Sotomayor, concluded that religious accommodations may “not significantly impinge on the 
interests of third parties.” Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 745 & n.8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(first citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230 (1972); then citing Estate of Thornton v. 
Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985); and then citing Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720, 722).  Justice 
Kennedy similarly concluded that religious exercise may not “unduly restrict other 
persons . . . in protecting their own interests, interests the law deems compelling.” Id. at 739 
(Kennedy, J., concurring); see also TEBBE, supra note 247, at 55–59 (arguing that the third-
party harm principle the Supreme Court articulated in Hobby Lobby is rooted in First 
Amendment jurisprudence). 
 251. See Gene Schaerr & Michael Worley, The “Third Party Harm” Rule:  Law or 
Wishful Thinking?, 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 629, 646 (2019) (“[T]he third-party harm 
‘rule’ is not ‘law’ under any reasonable understanding of the word.”); Berg, supra note 247, 
at 52 (pointing out that a number of “familiar, accepted religious accommodations involve 
clear effects on individual third parties”).  But see Nelson Tebbe et al., How Much May 
Religious Accommodations Burden Others?, in LAW, RELIGION, AND HEALTH IN THE UNITED 
STATES 215, 217 (Holly Fernandez Lynch et al. eds., 2017) (“But if the principle of avoiding 
harm to others is not absolute, that raises a crucial question:  how much burden-shifting to 
third parties is constitutionally permissible?”). 
 252. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 729 n.37; see also NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 126, at 
2531–33 (discussing how the third-party harm principle shaped the Court’s analysis in 
Hobby Lobby and how it is an “integral” part of the RFRA inquiry).  In her Hobby Lobby 
dissent, Justice Ginsburg emphasized the importance of also considering third-party harms 
when dealing with exemption questions under the Free Exercise Clause. Hobby Lobby, 573 
U.S. at 745 n.8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 253. Professor Tebbe adopts Title VII’s “undue hardship” test as the baseline for 
determining “how much harm to others can be tolerated before a religious accommodation 
becomes impermissible.” Tebbe et al., supra note 251, at 219.  Professor Gedicks, on the 
other hand, proposes “materiality”—derived from tort and contract law—as the appropriate 
standard for distinguishing third-party burdens that should preclude exemptions from 
burdens that should not. See Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 249, at 338. 
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However, courts are not uniformly considering third-party harms when 
applying strict scrutiny under state RFRAs.254  Indeed, the biggest critique 
of the third-party harm doctrine is that it does not take into account the 
dignitary harm suffered by the religious business owners if they are forced 
to serve LGBTQIA+ couples.255  The religious business owners seeking 
exemptions sincerely believe that they are “being asked to defy God’s will,” 
and as a result, will also suffer dignitary harm if they are forced to act 
contrary to their religious beliefs.256  Opponents of the third-party harm 
doctrine emphasize that the compelling interest test is “ultimately a 
balancing test” and that courts, therefore, cannot simply consider 
third-party harms without addressing the harm inflicted on the business 
owner if an exemption is not granted.257 
Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix258 is an LGBTQIA+ public 
accommodation case that clearly illustrates the doctrinal challenges in this 
area of the law.  In Brush & Nib Studio, Joanna Duka and Breanna Koski, 
designers of custom wedding invitations, sought a religious exemption from 
Phoenix’s Human Relations Ordinance259 (the “Ordinance”).260  The 
Ordinance prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation in places of 
public accommodation.261  Duka and Koski, therefore, would have been 
required to create custom invitations for same-sex wedding ceremonies in 
violation of their sincerely held religious beliefs.262 
Because of Smith, Duka and Koski based their religious exemption claim 
solely on Arizona’s state RFRA.263  In applying strict scrutiny under 
Arizona’s state RFRA, the majority formulated the city’s compelling 
interest as “eradicating discrimination.”264  However, the majority went on 
 
 254. See Melling, supra note 242, at 189 (“Less discussed, yet essential to the 
conversation, are the harms resulting from accommodations . . . .”). 
 255. See Berg, supra note 247, at 57; see also Laycock, supra note 12, at 378 (arguing 
that proponents of the third-party harm doctrine “never acknowledge the dignitary harm on 
the religious side”); Brief of Christian Legal Society, supra note 12, at 30 (“The Court must 
also consider the dignitary harm to the religious objectors . . . .”). 
 256. Laycock, supra note 12, at 378; Brief of Christian Legal Society, supra note 12, at 
31. 
 257. Laycock, supra note 12, at 378.  But cf. NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 126, at 2584–
85 (emphasizing that courts should “examine carefully the . . . material and dignitary effects 
of an accommodation” when adjudicating claims under state RFRAs); Denley, supra note 9, 
at 226 (arguing that the best way to address religious exemption claims is to “weigh the 
burden on the one claiming the freedom of religious expression . . . against the burden on the 
third party”). 
 258. 448 P.3d 890 (Ariz. 2019). 
 259. PHOENIX, ARIZ., CITY CODE ch. 18 (2021). 
 260. Brush & Nib Studio, 448 P.3d at 895–96. 
 261. Id. at 898.  Brush & Nib Studio was considered a public accommodation under the 
Ordinance. Id. at 899. 
 262. Id. at 899–900. 
 263. Id. at 918; see also supra Part II.B.1 (addressing how religious claimants have 
looked for ways to work around Smith). 
 264. Brush & Nib Studio, 448 P.3d at 922.  The majority did not take a firm position on 
the market access versus dignitary harms debate but instead concluded that the ordinance 
“generally” serves the compelling purpose of eradicating discrimination. Id.  The majority 
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to conclude that the “interest is not sufficiently overriding to force [Duka 
and Koski] to create custom wedding invitations celebrating same-sex 
marriage in violation of their sincerely held religious beliefs” and granted 
the religious exemption.265  In doing so, the court determined that uniform 
enforcement of the Ordinance was not the least restrictive means for the 
city to achieve its nondiscrimination purpose.266  To reach this conclusion, 
the court relied on the premise that the same-sex couple may obtain 
wedding-related services from other vendors.267 
The dissent, by contrast, formulated the city’s compelling interest as 
preventing the couple from experiencing the dignitary harm arising from 
the denial of services.268  The dissent concluded that the Ordinance’s 
uniform application would have been the least restrictive means of 
furthering the city’s goals and therefore would have supported the denial of 
the exemption.269  In criticizing the majority’s application of the compelling 
interest test, Judge Scott Bales proclaimed that “protections like the 
Ordinance have been put in place to ensure that we do not repeat the denials 
of access and opportunity that plagued our state in its infancy.”270 
Brush & Nib Studio highlights why current religious exemption doctrine 
inadequately addresses the broader questions presented in LGBTQIA+ 
public accommodation cases.271  Because of the Smith hurdle, Duka and 
Koski based their religious exemption claim on state law.272  The Arizona 
Supreme Court, therefore, applied strict scrutiny but ended up with polar 
opposite results.273  The majority did not consider the harms suffered by the 
LGBTQIA+ couple in its analysis.274  The dissent, on the other hand, 
emphasized the harm the couple suffered but barely addressed the harm 
 
did, however, rely on the premise of the market access theory as part of its least restrictive 
means analysis. See id. at 936 (Bales, J., dissenting). 
 265. Id. at 922, 926 (majority opinion). 
 266. See id. at 923 (“[T]he purpose of the Ordinance is properly served by permitting a 
narrow exemption for Plaintiff’s creation of . . . custom wedding invitations.”). 
 267. See id. at 936 (Bales, J., dissenting). 
 268. Id. (“The prohibition on discrimination not only promotes equal access, but also 
serves to eradicate . . . the attendant humiliation and stigma that result if businesses can 
selectively treat some customers as second-class citizens.”). 
 269. See id. at 936–37. 
 270. Id. at 937.  Judge Bales catalogued other instances where Arizonians have been 
denied access to goods and services “based on invidious discrimination.” Id. 
 271. See Loewentheil, supra note 52, at 476. 
 272. Brush & Nib Studio, 448 P.3d at 918. 
 273. With or without Smith in place, state court judges may still reach conflicting 
outcomes when interpreting their own state RFRAs.  However, Brush & Nib Studio 
illustrates the disagreements among courts over the purpose served by antidiscrimination 
laws and the significance of third-party harms.  More importantly, it underscores how a more 
streamlined framework may help to reconcile these different positions, even if the Supreme 
Court decides to overturn Smith. 
 274. See Brush & Nib Studio, 448 P.3d at 936 (Bales, J., dissenting). 
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Duka and Koski would suffer if they were required to make invitations for a 
same-sex wedding.275 
Because the central conflict in LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases 
is how to balance religious liberty and LGBTQIA+ equality interests and 
because the Smith and state RFRA standards do not have a consistent way 
of reconciling these interests, a departure from the standard doctrinal 
framework is warranted.276 
III.  AN IMPROVED COMPELLING INTEREST TEST 
In LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases, there are two fundamental 
interests at stake:  religious liberty and LGBTQIA+ rights.277  Although the 
Supreme Court has recognized the inherent tension between religious 
liberty and LGBTQIA+ rights, it has not fully addressed the conflict in 
these cases because of Smith.278  While Fulton presented the Court with a 
ripe opportunity to reconsider its decision in Smith, the Court sidestepped 
the question.279 
Absent further guidance from the Supreme Court, the religious 
exemption framework in place is insufficient for balancing the competing 
interests in LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases.280  To address the 
inadequacies of the current framework, this part proposes a streamlined 
compelling interest test lower courts may use when analyzing claims for 
religious exemptions.  By applying this test, courts can properly account for 
third-party harms and strike an appropriate balance between the rights of 
religious business owners and the rights of the LGBTQIA+ community. 
Because the Supreme Court has not revisited Smith, this framework is 
specifically designed for courts applying strict scrutiny under state 
RFRAs.281  Part III.A proposes that courts should formulate the state’s 
compelling interest in passing antidiscrimination laws as protecting against 
dignitary harms.  Part III.B argues that, in light of this compelling interest, 
courts should consider the degree of third-party harms in their least 
 
 275. Id. at 923–24 (majority opinion) (“Here, under the dissent’s least restrictive means 
test, the City’s nondiscrimination purpose simply overrides all conflicting individual rights 
and liberties.”). 
 276. See Loewentheil, supra note 52, at 475–76. 
 277. See supra Part II.A (outlining the inherent clash between liberty and equality in 
LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases). 
 278. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing how the Court did not address Smith in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop and Fulton). 
 279. See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1928 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring) (critiquing the majority for “circumnavigat[ing]” the question of whether to 
overrule Smith). 
 280. See Loewentheil, supra note 52, at 465; see also supra Part II (explaining the 
doctrinal challenges presented by Smith and state RFRAs). 
 281. If the Supreme Court decides to overrule Smith and adopt heightened scrutiny for 
religious exemption claims under the Free Exercise Clause, courts can easily modify and 
apply this framework in the free exercise context as well. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 745 n.8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing how “[a] balanced 
approach is all the more in order” when religious exemption claims involve the Free 
Exercise Clause, as opposed to statutory protections). 
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restrictive means analysis, as guided by Professor Nelson Tebbe’s “undue 
hardship” standard.282 
A.  States’ Compelling Interest in Protecting LGBTQIA+ Americans 
As previously discussed, claimants in LGBTQIA+ public 
accommodation cases typically seek religious exemptions from 
antidiscrimination law under state RFRAs.283  Many state RFRAs provide 
that courts must analyze religious exemption claims under strict scrutiny.284  
A government policy can survive strict scrutiny “only if it advances 
‘interests of the highest order’ and is narrowly tailored to achieve those 
interests.”285  In applying strict scrutiny, courts first formulate the 
government’s compelling interest.286 
Lower courts are currently in disagreement over what government 
interests public accommodation laws serve, particularly whether the laws 
aim to improve market access or to protect consumers from dignitary harm 
if they are denied services.287  Relatedly, courts also have different 
understandings about whether third-party harms should be factored into the 
compelling interest analysis.288  However, free exercise and RFRA 
jurisprudence both strongly support considering the impact of third-party 
harms when analyzing religious exemption claims.289  Given that state 
RFRAs closely track the federal RFRA,290 this section argues that it is 
indeed appropriate for courts to consider third-party harms in their 
compelling interest analyses. 
Accordingly, courts should understand the state as having a compelling 
interest in preventing LGBTQIA+ Americans from dignitary harms 
stemming from being turned away from a place of public accommodation.  
While antidiscrimination laws certainly have a goal of expanding market 
access to individuals who historically have been denied economic 
opportunities, the true purpose of antidiscrimination law is rooted in 
protecting human dignity.291  Both Congress and the Supreme Court have 
recognized this overarching goal.292  When applying the compelling interest 
 
 282. See supra note 253 and accompanying text (outlining Professor Tebbe’s undue 
hardship framework). 
 283. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 284. See Lund, supra note 76, at 164. 
 285. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1881 (2021) (quoting Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993)). 
 286. See id. 
 287. See Sepper, supra note 126, at 153; see also supra Part II.C.1 (explaining the 
different ways courts formulate the state’s purpose in passing antidiscrimination laws). 
 288. See Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 20, at 157; see also supra Part II.C.2. 
 289. See supra notes 247–53 and accompanying text. 
 290. Lund, supra note 76, at 164. 
 291. See Sepper, supra note 126, at 154 (arguing that the eradication of institutionalized 
humiliation is the “primary aim of antidiscrimination law”). 
 292. See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 126, at 2575 (“Just as Congress took the social 
meaning of refusals into consideration in fashioning antidiscrimination laws governing 
public accommodations, so too should the social meaning of refusals factor in judgments 
about whether and how to grant persons religious exemptions from laws of general 
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test in LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases, courts should recognize 
this purpose and formulate the state’s compelling interest in passing 
antidiscrimination laws as protecting LGBTQIA+ individuals from 
suffering harm to their personhood. 
B.  Undue Hardship:  Grounds for Denying Religious Exemptions 
After formulating the government’s compelling interest, courts turn to 
the narrow tailoring portion of the strict scrutiny test.293  Legislation is 
narrowly tailored if it is the least restrictive means of achieving the 
government’s compelling interest.294  In LGBTQIA+ public 
accommodation cases, courts consider whether the antidiscrimination law, 
as applied to the religious claimant, represents the least restrictive means of 
achieving the government’s compelling interest.295  In building off the 
compelling interest part of the test, the third-party harm doctrine should be 
incorporated into the narrow tailoring analysis.296 
Professor Tebbe’s “undue hardship” standard is a way for courts to 
incorporate the third-party harm doctrine into their least restrictive means 
analyses.  Although Professor Tebbe did not structure his undue hardship 
proposal in the context of the compelling interest test, he was primarily 
concerned with finding a threshold standard for determining when the 
existence of a third-party harm outweighs extending a religious 
exemption.297  Since this balancing is exactly what courts are doing when 
they apply strict scrutiny, Professor Tebbe’s undue hardship framework is 
an attractive and workable standard that courts can use in this context to 
account for third-party harms. 
Professor Tebbe derives his undue hardship framework from 
employment discrimination law.298  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
requires employers to provide “reasonable accommodations” for the 
religious observances of their workers, unless doing so would result in 
“undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”299  The 
Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of Title VII’s religious 
 
application.”); see also supra Part II.C.1 (discussing how the Supreme Court has recognized 
the government’s interest in protecting individual dignity rights). 
 293. See supra Parts II.B.2, II.C.1. 
 294. See Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890, 923 (Ariz. 2019) 
(citing Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 728 (2014)). 
 295. See, e.g., Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140, 163–64 (3d Cir. 2019), rev’d, 
141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021). 
 296. See Loewentheil, supra note 52, at 495 (“If the state’s compelling interest is 
understood to include protecting [LGBTQIA+ dignitary and equality rights], then the narrow 
tailoring analysis changes as well.”); see also NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 126, at 2584–
85. 
 297. See Tebbe et al., supra note 251, at 217 (“In other words, once it has been 
established that a third party has suffered some kind of burden as a consequence of a 
religious accommodation, how much of a burden is too much?”). 
 298. See id. 
 299. Id. at 220 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)). 
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accommodation provision in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison.300  
There, an airline employee requested Saturdays off to observe the Sabbath, 
as required by his faith.301  The airline was unable to accommodate his 
request, mainly because of how days off were apportioned under its 
collective bargaining agreement.302  The Court explained that, for purposes 
of Title VII, an undue hardship imposes “more than a de minimis cost” on 
the operation of the employer’s business.303  To help discern de minimis 
costs, the Court considered both economic and noneconomic factors, 
including staffing changes, wage increases, and lost efficiency in other 
departments.304  After considering these factors, the Court held that the 
company would incur an undue hardship if it was required to depart from 
its contractually mandated system to accommodate the employee’s 
religion.305 
In his third-party harm theory, Professor Tebbe adopts the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of undue hardship in Hardison, explaining that “the 
undue hardship standard . . . tracks the concern with religious 
accommodations that shift harms to other private citizens.”306  Professor 
Tebbe contends that religious accommodations should be denied if they 
would impose more than de minimis costs on third parties and, conversely, 
should be granted when they would impose less than de minimis costs on 
third parties.307 
In incorporating Professor Tebbe’s undue hardship framework into the 
least restrictive means analysis, courts should consider whether the 
same-sex couple experiences an undue hardship when the religious business 
owner refuses service.  If the same-sex couple experiences an undue 
hardship, uniform enforcement of the public accommodation law is the 
least restrictive means of furthering the government’s goal of protecting 
LGBTQIA+ Americans from suffering dignitary harm.  The court should 
thus deny the religious exemption.  On the other hand, if the same-sex 
couple does not experience an undue hardship, uniform enforcement is not 
the least restrictive means of achieving the government’s interest, and the 
court should grant the religious exemption. 
 
 300. 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
 301. See id. at 67–68. 
 302. Id. at 68. 
 303. Id. at 84. 
 304. See id. at 84–85; see also Webb v. City of Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 
2009) (“Both economic and non-economic costs can pose an undue hardship upon 
employers . . . .”); Small v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water, 952 F.3d 821, 825 (6th Cir. 2020) 
(per curiam) (considering whether “additional accommodations would have impeded the 
company’s operations, burdened other employees, and violated its seniority system”), cert. 
denied, 141 S. Ct. 1227 (2021). 
 305. Trans World Airlines, 432 U.S. at 83 (“TWA was not required by Title VII to carve 
out a special exception to its seniority system in order to help Hardison to meet his religious 
obligations.”). 
 306. Tebbe et al., supra note 251, at 228. 
 307. See id. at 217. 
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The Supreme Court’s de minimis cost analysis from Hardison, as 
interpreted by Professor Tebbe, is a helpful baseline for courts to reference 
to determine whether a couple experiences an undue hardship.308  To 
determine whether the harm to the couple amounts to an undue hardship, 
courts should consult both economic and noneconomic factors, focusing on 
“the fact as well as the magnitude of the alleged undue hardship.”309  By 
conducting a fact-specific inquiry, courts can properly weigh the interests 
of the religious claimant against the interests of the LGBTQIA+ couple.310 
Turning first to economic factors, courts should examine the financial 
costs the LGBTQIA+ couple would incur in looking for an alternative 
provider.311  In thinking about these costs, courts should consider the 
following questions:  Is there another provider nearby, or would the couple 
need to travel to find another provider?  Will the goods or services be more 
expensive from the other provider?  Will there be additional delivery or 
shipping fees?312  If the LGBTQIA+ couple can obtain the same product or 
service with relatively little financial burden, there is less of an undue 
hardship and the scales tip in favor of granting the religious business owner 
an exemption.  But, if there is a substantial financial burden placed on the 
couple to find another provider, there is more of an undue hardship, which 
supports denial of the exemption. 
However, courts should not make their decisions based on monetary 
costs alone; they should also consider nonmonetary factors.  An important 
nonmonetary factor courts should consider is whether the LGBTQIA+ 
couple had a prior long-standing relationship with the vendor or if the 
LGBTQIA+ couple interacted with the vendor as part of a one-time 
arm’s-length transaction.313  If the LGBTQIA+ couple had a pre-existing 
 
 308. Courts and scholars have criticized the Supreme Court’s de minimis test as 
disfavoring religious claimants seeking accommodations under Title VII. See, e.g., Small, 
952 F.3d at 829 (Thapar, J., concurring) (observing that religious claimants are harmed by 
“decisions like Hardison”); Storslee, supra note 245, at 936 (arguing that “the Court in 
Hardison focused solely on the cost side of the equation with no regard for the significance 
of the [religious] activity”).  This Note adopts Professor Tebbe’s interpretation of the undue 
hardship standard as part of a context-specific balancing test. See Tebbe et al., supra note 
251, at 223 (“Even though the Supreme Court’s de minimis interpretation of the undue 
hardship standard sounds uncompromising, it has, in fact, been applied in ways that are more 
balanced.”). 
 309. Webb, 562 F.3d at 260; see also Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 
1243 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (observing how courts must consider “the particular 
factual context of each case” when deciding whether a religious accommodation imposes an 
undue hardship (quoting Anderson v. Gen. Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 589 F.2d 
397, 400 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979))). 
 310. See Tebbe et al., supra note 251, at 216–17.  This section rejects the position set 
forth by certain scholars that the presence of third-party harms automatically warrants the 
denial of religious exemptions. See Melling, supra note 242, at 191–92. 
 311. The government has the burden of proof to produce evidence as to each of these 
monetary and nonmonetary factors. 
 312. Courts should consider any financial burden placed on the LGBTQIA+ couple to 
find a substitute provider.  This list of factors is not exhaustive. 
 313. See Arlene I, 389 P.3d 543, 549 (Wash. 2017), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 138 
S. Ct. 2671 (2018).  Robert Ingersoll and Curt Freed were customers at Arlene’s Flowers for 
over nine years and considered Stutzman, the owner, to be “[their] florist.” Id. (alteration in 
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relationship with the vendor, it is very likely that the rejection caused 
greater harm, as compared to a situation where the couple did not have a 
personal connection with the vendor.314 
In addition, courts should consider whether the vendor treated the 
LGBTQIA+ couple with any type of animus.  Did the vendor clearly 
explain why it was denying services or simply turn the couple away?315  
Did the vendor offer to help the couple find an alternative provider?316  
Relatedly, courts can also look at whether there was backlash from the local 
community against the vendor, the couple, or both parties.317 
After considering both monetary and nonmonetary factors, courts will be 
able to determine whether the harm to the couple results in an undue 
hardship.  Only if the court determines that the third-party harm is not an 
undue hardship should it grant the religious claimant’s request for an 
exemption.  Otherwise, the exemption should be denied in favor of the 
uniform enforcement of the antidiscrimination law.  Put another way, if the 
third-party harm amounts to an undue hardship, then the uniform 
enforcement of the law to all public-facing businesses is the least restrictive 
means of reaching the state’s goal of protecting against dignitary harms, 
and the exemption should not be granted. 
The compelling interest test presented above, as guided by the third-party 
harm doctrine and the undue hardship principle, can help to resolve the 
disagreements present in a case like Brush & Nib Studio.  As previously 
discussed, the Arizona Supreme Court in Brush & Nib Studio was starkly 
divided over whether to grant Duka and Koski, designers of custom 
wedding invitations, a religious exemption from Phoenix’s public 
accommodation law, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation.318  The majority ruled that Duka and Koski were entitled to an 
exemption under Arizona’s state RFRA.319 
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relationship with a vendor as opposed to an arm’s-length relationship). 
 314. See Laycock, supra note 12, at 377. 
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If the majority had considered the harm suffered by the same-sex couple 
when formulating its compelling interest and employed the undue hardship 
standard in its least restrictive means analysis, it may have come to a 
different conclusion about whether to grant the exemption.  The dissenting 
judges may have also reached an alternative outcome if they had both 
looked more closely at costs associated with the couple’s search for a 
different wedding card designer and considered whether Duka and Koski 
offered to help the couple find another wedding card designer.320 
By incorporating Professor Tebbe’s undue hardship framework into the 
compelling interest test, courts can more equitably balance the interests of 
the claimants seeking religious exemptions against the interests of the 
LGBTQIA+ couples that are denied services.  This streamlined framework 
also resolves the disagreements among courts about how and when to 
consider third-party harms in deciding whether to grant religious 
exemptions to antidiscrimination laws.  In adopting this balanced approach, 
courts are better equipped to navigate the challenging questions at issue in 
LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases. 
CONCLUSION 
LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases represent an inherent tension 
between two important values in American society—liberty and equality.  
While the United States has a longstanding commitment to religious 
freedom, its Constitution also guarantees all Americans equal protection 
under the law.  State and local governments have greatly expanded 
protections for LGBTQIA+ Americans, but these protections conflict with 
the way certain Americans choose to exercise their religious beliefs. 
The Supreme Court has not yet weighed in on this conflict because of 
Smith, and it circumvented an opportunity to address the broader questions 
in Fulton.  Whether or not the Supreme Court decides to overrule Smith, 
state courts should attempt to reconcile these two competing principles by 
incorporating third-party harms and the undue hardship framework into 
their compelling interest and least restrictive means analyses.  While this 
judicial framework is not a complete solution to the underlying cultural and 
social conflicts in LGBTQIA+ public accommodation cases, utilizing the 
framework is one way for courts to attempt to balance the law’s competing 
commitments to equality and religious freedom. 
 
 320. See id. at 923 (criticizing the dissent for “focusing exclusively on the impact an 
exemption might have on same-sex couples” and not considering Duka’s and Koski’s free 
exercise rights). 
